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ARTICLE
Do CONSTITUTIONS REQUIRING

ADHERENCE TO SHARI'A
THREATEN HUMAN RIGHTS?
How EGYPT'S CONSTITUTIONAL
COURT RECONCILES ISLAMIC LAW
WITH THE LIBERAL RULE OF LAW*
CLARK B. LOMBARDI & NATHAN

J. BROWN"

Over the last thirty years, a number of Muslim countries,
including most recently Afghanistan and Iraq, have adopted
constitutions that require the law of the state to respect
fundamental Islamic legal norms. What happens when
countries with a secular legal system adopt these
"constitutional Islamization" provisions? How do courts
interpret them? What are the effects on the regulation of the
economy or on human rights? This article will present a case
study of constitutional Islamization in one important and

*

Editor's Note: ILR editors typically check citation Bluebook form and verify the

substantive aspects of both the text and footnotes. This article draws upon a
number of foreign language sources, including case law in Arabic. ILR has edited
citation form to the greatest extent possible, but our substantive editing of these
foreign sources is not exhaustive. In this text, Arabic words have not been fully
transliterated. An apostrophe (') has been used to render the letter "hamza" and a
reverse apostrophe (') has been used to render the letter "'ayn." Macrons have not
been used nor have dots been put under consonants unique to Arabic.
** Nathan Brown is a full professor at George Washington University, currently in
residence at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Clark Lombardi is
an assistant professor at the University of Washington School of Law. The authors
wish to thank Justice Adel Omar Sherif for his assistance in acquiring and
interpreting the cases discussed in this article and Rali Badissy for research and
editing assistance.
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influential country, Egypt. In
interpreting Egypt's
constitutional Islamization provision,
the
Supreme
Constitutional Court of Egypt has over the last twenty years
developed a creative new theory of Islamic law. Employing this
method, the Court has interpreted shari'a norms to be
consistent with international human rights norms and with
liberal economic policies. The experience of Egypt does not
tell us how constitutionalIslamization will necessarily unfold
in every country. It does demonstrate that, in a world where
Islamic norms are contested, a progressive court with judicial
prestige and independence can develop and apply a theory that
interpretsIslamic legal norms to be consistent with democracy,
internationalhuman rights and economic liberalism.
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INTRODUCTION
Over the last thirty years, a number of Muslim countries have
adopted constitutions containing provisions requiring the law of the
state to be consistent with the norms of shari'a, meaning Islamic
law.' The Muslim world's enthusiasm for enacting these
"constitutional Islamization" clauses shows no signs of abating.

I. Countries with a majority Muslim population that have, through enactment
or amendment, given Islamic legal norms a preferred position in the constitutional
scheme include, inter alia, Afghanistan, see AFG. CONST. art. 3; Egypt, see EGYPT
CONST. art. 2; Iran, see IRAN CONST. 1358 [1980] arts. 2-4; Pakistan, see PAK.
CONST. art. 227; Qatar, see QATAR CONST. art. 1; Sudan, see SUDAN
TRANSITIONAL CONST. art. 4; Saudi Arabia, whose Basic Law declares both that
shari'a is binding law and that all legislation repugnant to shari'a is
unenforceable, see Royal Decree No. A/90 art. 1, reprinted in BUSINESS LAWS OF
SAUDI ARABIA 4.1-3, 4.1-4 (Nicola H. Karam trans., 2002); and Yemen, see
YEMEN CONST. art. 3.
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Afghanistan's new constitution contains such a provision. Iraq's
recently adopted constitution also includes one.3 It is notable that the
Afghan and Iraqi constitutions were each drafted with some degree
of assistance from the international community, and officials in the
U.S. hailed their ratification as enormously positive developments. 4
Apparently, the international community has concluded that the trend
towards constitutional Islamization is harmless or else unstoppable.
How are constitutional Islamization provisions interpreted, and
what impact do they have on legal systems? Some scholars and
policy-makers in the United States have suggested that constitutional
Islamization provisions must inevitably lead to important and
unfortunate changes to the legal system. In particular, some fear that
constitutional Islamization clauses will hinder a country's ability to
develop democratic governance structures, to conform to human
rights norms, or to engage fully in the global economy.' Other
2. Article 3 of the new Afghan Constitution thus reads: "No law shall
contravene the tenets and provisions of the holy religion of Islam in Afghanistan."
AFG. CONST. art. 3.
3. Article 2 of the Constitution, ratified in October 2005, reads in relevant
part,
•..Islam is the state's official religion and it is a foundational source of
legislation: (a) It is not permissible to enact a law that contradicts the fixed
rulings of Islamic law. (b) It is not permissible to enact a law that contradicts
the principles of democracy. (c) It is not permissible to enact a law that
contradicts the basic rights and liberties mentioned in this constitution....
(Please note that Arabic uses technical terms in unusual ways and is difficult to
translate. The translation here is by the authors and departs from that of the
translations most widely linked to on the internet.)
4. For the drafting of Afghanistan's Constitution, see INT'L CRISIS GROUP,
ASIA REPORT No. 56, AFGHANISTAN'S FLAWED CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS 13-21

(2003). The permanent Iraqi Constitution was drafted with less direct input from
outsiders than the Afghan Constitution. Nevertheless, it was drafted and ratified
during a period of occupation, and leading figures in the U.S. government hailed it
as a crucial step in the re-establishment of liberal democracy in the region.
5. See, e.g., SONALI KOLHATKAR, FOREIGN POLICY IN Focus, AFGHAN
WOMEN CONTINUE TO FEND FOR THEMSELVES 3 (2004), available at
http://www.fpif.org/pdf/papers/SR2004afghanwom.pdf (noting the "ominous
inclusion of the supremacy of Islamic law in the [Afghan] constitution"). An
opinion piece by J. Alexander Their, an advisor to Afghanistan's Constitutional
Commission, has expressed similar sentiments. J. Alexander Their, Attacking
Democracy from the Bench, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2004, at A23 (arguing that
Afghanistan's Constitution does not firmly protect human rights because "it has a
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scholars disagree, arguing instead that the trend towards
constitutional Islamization is not, in itself, harmful. 6 The reasoning
cited in support of these conflicting conclusions tends to be intuitive
or anecdotal. At this point, there is a need for more systematic case
studies of constitutional Islamization-studies examining the
methods that judges on constitutional courts use to interpret Islamic
law, and studies looking for patterns in the Islamic jurisprudence that
are emerging in constitutional courts around the Muslim world. Such
studies are needed to understand whether the current trend towards
constitutional Islamization in the Muslim world presents a challenge
to the spread of international human rights norms and, if so, what is
the exact nature of that challenge.
This article and the translation that follows it7 will describe the
constitutional Islamization provision in force in one important and
influential country, Egypt. It will also describe the way in which that
provision has been interpreted and applied by the Supreme
Constitutional Court of Egypt ("SCC"), and it will consider briefly
the implications of the Egyptian experience. Part I describes the
decision by the Egyptian government to enact a constitutional
provision (Article 2) that apparently required all Egyptian law to be
consistent with shari'a principles. This new provision raised two
complex issues. The first issue was whether the courts had
jurisdiction to hear constitutional challenges to legislation on the
ground that it was inconsistent with Islamic law. Eventually, the

very dangerous loophole: it states that no law can be contrary to the 'beliefs and
provisions' of Islam"); see also State Dep't Report on Int'l Religious Freedom:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Int'l Terrorism, Nonproliferation & Hum. Rts.,
108th Cong. (2004) (statement of Joseph K. Grieboski, Founder and President,
Institute on Religion and Public Policy) (citing a Jan. 26, 2004 letter from U.S.
Senator Rick Santorum to Ambassador Paul Bremer asserting that "[t]he most
immediate threat to religious freedom lies in proposals to overturn the religious

neutrality of Iraq's interim constitution").
6. See, e.g., NOAH FELDMAN, AFTER JIHAD: AMERICA AND THE STRUGGLE
FOR ISLAMIC DEMOCRACY 55 (2003) (proposing that constitutional Islamization
clauses existing in Egypt can be expected to be a part of the Islamic landscape in
the future, and are not, in themselves, problematic).
7. Nathan J. Brown & Clark B. Lombardi, The Supreme ConstitutionalCourt
of Egypt on Islamic Law, Veiling and Civil Rights: An Annotated Translation of
Supreme Constitutional Court of Egypt Case No. 8 of Judicial Year 17 (May 18,
1996), 21 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 437 (2006).
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SCC, which is the authoritative interpreter of the Egyptian
Constitution, determined that it did have jurisdiction over somethough not all-of these cases. Having made this ruling, the Court
had to address a second issue: in modem Egypt, there has been no
consensus, even among Islamist political factions, about who can
interpret Islamic law or about the proper methodology for Islamic
legal interpretation. How was a court supposed to identify the shari 'a
principles against which state law would be measured?
To understand the Court's approach to interpreting Article 2, it is
important to have at least passing familiarity with some important
theories of Islamic law upon which the Court drew. Part II of this
article will describe these theories.
Part III of the article will describe the method that the SCC has
developed to date for identifying and interpreting the shari'a
principles which Article 2 requires the state to respect. It will begin
by discussing the SCC itself and stressing the Court's commitment to
a liberal constitutionalist vision. It will then describe the way in
which the justices of the SCC have tried to articulate a method of
interpretation that will be recognized as appropriate by a wide range
of Egyptians, but which can also be used to interpret Islamic law in a
progressive manner that is consistent with the SCC's liberal
constitutionalist philosophy.
In the last section of Part III, the article will summarize an
important Article 2 case in which the Court upheld restrictions on
veiling in public schools. This will illustrate how the Court's
approach is carried out in practice. (Following this article, there is a
companion article, which provides a complete translation of this
case.)8 We have chosen to focus on this case both because it provides
a good example of Article 2 jurisprudence and involves issues of
broad interest-touching upon important issues of women's rights,
freedom of expression, free exercise of religion and the authority of
governments to regulate schools. 9 The translation should be a useful

8. See id.

9. Governmental restrictions on public veiling have been hotly challenged in
high profile cases in constitutional courts in Europe and in Turkey. The BBC has
put online an interactive map of nations witnessing litigation over government
bans on headscarves. This map includes links to various news pieces discussing
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resource for those teaching Islamic law to non-Arabic speakers, and
for those performing research on law and human rights in the Middle
East. '0
We will conclude this article with a few brief thoughts on the
ramifications of our findings. As this article and the following
translation each show, the adoption of constitutional Islamization
clauses has brought a new group of thinkers into the debate about the
nature of Islamic law and its role in modem states, namely judges.
These judges have added an intriguing new voice to Islamic legal
debates. Judges have a very different training than traditional Islamic
religious scholars and most modernist Islamist political activists.
Looking at the Islamic legal tradition, the justices of the SCC have
proposed a theory of Islamic legal interpretation that marries the
national commitment to Islamic law with the Court's commitment to
liberal constitutionalism. Given the uniqueness of the Court's theory
and the progressive results to which that theory has led, it is striking
that the theory has to date been embraced, with some caveats, by
lower courts, and it also seems to have been accepted by the
Egyptian public.
The development of Article 2 jurisprudence reveals that judges on
constitutional courts are not simply passive participants in the
debates over the constitutional role of Islamic law in the modem
world. They are legal thinkers with the power to shape the way
Islamization is experienced and, ultimately, how it is conceptualized
by people. A study of the SCC's interpretation of Article 2 does not
tell us how constitutional Islamization will necessarily evolve in
every country. 1 The history of Article 2 to date does demonstrate,

this litigation. See Headscarves in the Headlines, BBC NEWS, Feb. 10, 2004,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/europe/3476163.stm (last visited Oct. 21, 2005).
10. At a recent Association of American Law Schools national conference
panel on the teaching of Islamic law in law schools, there was consensus that one
of the great impediments to teaching Islamic law in the United States and to
discussing Islamic law with non-experts is the lack of English translations of court
cases from the Arab world interpreting Islamic law. See Ass'n of Am. L. Sch. et
al., Workshop on Islamic Law, http://www.aals.org/am2004/islamiclaw/ (last
visited Oct. 21, 2005).
11. The Egyptian political and legal systems are in flux. Even in Egypt, then, it
is possible that the SCC's Article 2 jurisprudence will be modified by future courts
or that it will be applied in a more conservative manner.
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however, that Islamic legal theory has become contested terrain in
the modem era. If a court has sufficient prestige and independence, it
will have considerable flexibility to interpret and apply Islamic law
in a way that is consistent with its overarching constitutional
philosophy. A progressive court can thus "Islamize" state law in a
way that is consistent with democracy, international human rights
and economic liberalism.

I. BACKGROUND
To understand why Egyptians constitutionalized Islamic law and
the difficulties that constitutional Islamization posed, it helps to have
some background. Just before the modem era, most Egyptian
Muslims assumed that state law should be consistent with the rulings
and goals of shari'a. During this period, there was considerable
consensus about how Muslims should interpret shari'a and thus a
consensus on the meaning of shari'a itself. In the modem era,
secularists challenged that assumption and secularized Egyptian
law.'" Dismayed by the secularization of Egyptian law, Islamist
organizations eventually succeeded in pressuring the Egyptian
government to adopt a constitutional provision requiring Egyptian
law to conform to shari'a principles. 3 By this time, however,
consensus had broken down on how to interpret shari 'a. Courts were

12. After the Islamic invasion in the seventh century, the Egyptian legal order
was deeply informed by the shari'a. During the second half of the nineteenth
century, European influences-particularly ideas from the French Revolution, and
scholars like Rifa'a Tahtawi and Taha Husayn-began to influence Egyptian law.

A more secular orientation emerged, seen in an 1837 Organic Law that regulated
government based on contemporary European works. See Kevin Boyle & Adel
Omar Sherif, The Road to the 1971 Constitution: A Brief ConstitutionalHistory of
Modern Egypt, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY: THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF EGYPT 3, 4 (Kevin Boyle & Adel Omar Sherif eds.,
1996); JOHN L. ESPOSITO, THE ISLAMIC THREAT: MYTH OR REALITY 56-62 (3d ed.
1999).
13. Political pressure was reinforced by acts of violence. For example, militant
Islamic organizations, such as Muhammad's Youth, the Army of God and the
Islamic Society, attacked bars, nightclubs, government buildings, and other areas

influenced by Western behavior. In the heated environment, Anwar al-Sadat

amended the Constitution in 1980, declaring "Islam is the religion of the state" and
shari'awas "the main source of legislation." ESPOSITO, supra note 12, at 94-95.
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thus faced with the challenge of interpreting and applying a provision
that meant different things to different people.
A. THE CLASSICAL IDEAL OF A STATE WHOSE LAW
WAS CONSISTENT WITH SHARI'A

Prior to the nineteenth century, classical Islamic legal theory
shaped political thought in the Muslim Mediterranean and helped
dictate state behavior. Classical Islamic legal theory assumed that
God's law, the shari'a,should be interpreted in the first instance by
classical Islamic legal scholars. It was also accepted, however, that
scholarly interpretation of shari'a ('"ftqh") might differ from one
group of scholars to another. A legitimate ruler had an obligation to
enact laws that were consistent, in some broad sense, with one of the
competing "orthodox" interpretations of shari'a. To ensure
compliance, the ruler could appoint Islamic legal scholars to resolve
disputes according to theirfiqh; alternatively, most scholars believed
the ruler could develop statutes in consultation with Islamic legal
scholars. In a later part of this article, we will discuss in detail the
classical methods of interpreting shari'a and of developing
14
legitimate state law.

B. SECULARISM AND ISLAMISM IN THE MODERN ERA

Courts in the Ottoman Empire, which controlled Egypt through
much of the nineteenth century, had appliedfiqh or statutes informed
byfiqh.15 Over the course of the nineteenth century, the governments
in many Arab Muslim areas, including the increasingly autonomous
region of Egypt, moved to reform their legal systems and often to
Europeanize them based on the civil law model. 16 In countries like

14. See infra Part II.A.

15. The extent to which shari'a law was actually in force is a matter of some
dispute among scholars, but two detailed examinations of legal practice in Egypt
and the Ottoman Empire demonstrate the influence of shari 'a-based laws and court
systems. See GALAL H. EL-NAHAL, THE JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION OF OTTOMAN
EGYPT IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY (1979); HAIM GERBER, STATE, SOCIETY,
AND LAW IN ISLAM: OTTOMAN LAW IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

(1994).

16. See NATHAN J. BROWN, THE RULE OF LAW IN THE ARAB WORLD: COURTS
IN EGYPT AND THE GULF 2-3 (1997) (explaining that between 1869 and 1877, the
Ottoman majalla, or codification effort, was influenced by the model of the Code

388
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Egypt, the Europeanization of law involved two separate, though
overlapping, developments. First, governments restructured their
legislative, administrative and judicial sectors. Second, they applied
codes of statutory law, which were published in a national gazette
and administered by a centralized court system.' 7 Such developments
were not, by themselves, incompatible with Islamic theories of
legitimate government. So long as the new statutes were drafted with
the input of classical Islamic legal scholars and consistent with their
fiqh, the codes could easily be characterized as legitimate
expressions of Islamic legislation. The codified laws, however, came
increasingly, to reflect European norms at the expense of traditional
Islamic norms. In 1882, the Egyptian government finally moved to
adopt comprehensive codes. Although some initial codification
efforts had included religious scholars, the government did not
submit their codes to the leading Sunni jurists for approval. In fact,
the codes generally reflected European rather than Islamic legal
norms. 8 After 1882, Islamic legal norms remained operative in
Egypt primarily in matters of personal status, including marriage,
divorce and inheritance.' 9
In the early twentieth century, "Islamist" organizations, such as
the Muslim Brotherhood, ° were formed in Egypt, and agitated for a

Napolbon). Egypt, an Ottoman province, in the 1870s and 80s established a court
system modeled on the French system, which applied a code based upon the Code
Napolkon. Id. at 29-3 1.
17. See id. at 24 (discussing the hierarchical, centralized system, which was a
fundamental feature of the non-shari'a judicial structure that existed in Egypt
during the first three-quarters of the nineteenth century). During this time, the
officials in Cairo exhibited a great deal of control, and limited the role of local and
village councils to minor issues and cases. Id.
18. See id. at 32.
19. See generally J. N. D. ANDERSON, ISLAMIC LAW IN THE MODERN WORLD
81-82 (1959).
20. For the history of some of these movements and a bibliography, see, for
example, ESPOSITO, supra note 12, at 53-118. One group important in Egypt that
Esposito does not discuss was the quasi-fascist group Young Egypt, discussed in
CLARK B. LOMBARDI, STATE LAW AS ISLAMIC LAW IN MODERN EGYPT: THE
INCORPORATION OF THE SHARI'A INTO EGYPTIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 104

(forthcoming 2006).
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return to Islamic law. 21 The adoption of Western governmental
structures by Arab states like Egypt and corresponding acceptance of
this development by Egyptian Islamists affected subsequent Islamist
political demands, which increasingly came to be couched in
"constitutionalist" terms. As majority Muslim states in the Arab
world moved to a European-style legal system, they often adopted
formal, written constitutional documents.22 As constitutionalism
began to pervade legal thinking in the Muslim world, Islamist groups
began to express their demands in Islamic terms. They sought to
guarantee a role for Islamic law in the state by demanding that
constitutional language be adopted which required state law 'to be
consistent with Islamic law.23 The demand for constitutionalization
of Islamic law was particularly powerful in Egypt.
C. THE ADOPTION OF ARTICLE 2

In 1970, as Egypt prepared to adopt a new constitution, Egyptian
Islamists were able to convince the government to create an explicit
constitutional role for the Islamic shari'a. Egypt's 1971 Constitution
thus became the first Egyptian constitution to mention Islamic law

21. By this, most Islamists meant that all codified law in the modem state must
be drafted so as to be consistent with the shari'a.On the Brothers, see RICHARD P.
MITCHELL, THE SOCIETY OF THE MUSLIM BROTHERS (1993); BRYNJAR LIA, THE
SOCIETY OF THE MUSLIM BROTHERS IN EGYPT: THE RISE OF AN ISLAMIC MASS
MOVEMENT 1928-1942 (1998).

22. See
generally NATHAN
J.
BROWN,
CONSTITUTIONS
IN
A
NONCONSTITUTIONAL WORLD: ARAB BASIC LAWS AND THE PROSPECTS FOR
ACCOUNTABLE GOVERNMENT 3-91 (2002). Some of the last holdouts in the Arab

world were Saudi Arabia and Oman, who eventually promulgated "basic laws" in
the 1990s. Id. at 3, 54-61.
23. Arab constitutional documents in the first half of the twentieth century
largely confined themselves to symbolic language establishing Islam as the state
religion. See Nathan J. Brown & Adel Omar Sherif, Inscribing the Islamic Shari'a
in Arab Constitutional Law, in ISLAMIC LAW AND THE CHALLENGES OF
MODERNITY 55, 60-62 (2004). In the second half of the twentieth century,
however, Islamist political movements successfully demanded the explicit
incorporation of Islamic shari'a into the constitutional order. See id. at 63-66.
Pressures to Islamize constitutions were also felt in non-Arab countries, such as
Iran, see generally Ann Elizabeth Mayer, Islam and the State, 12 CARDOzO L.
REV. 1015, 1035-42 (1991), Afghanistan, see, e.g., INT'L CRISIS GROUP, ASIA
BRIEFING No. 29, AFGHANISTAN: THE CONSTITUTIONAL LOYA JIRGA (2003), and
Pakistan, Mayer, supra, at 1042-47.
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(and not merely Islam as a religion), and to give Islamic law an
explicit role. Article 2 of the Constitution proclaimed that "the
principles of the Islamic shari 'a are a chief source (masdar"" ra 'isiU")
of legislation."24 Over the course of the 1970s, Islamism grew
stronger, and the government began to prepare Islamic revisions to
Egyptian law. 25 Furthermore, the wording of Article 2 was subtly but
significantly strengthened in 1980. In the phrase cited above, the
word "a" was changed to "the." With that change, the principles of
the Islamic shari'a ceased to be one among many chief sources of
Islamic law and, instead, became "the chief source" (al-masdaralra 'isi) of Egyptian legislation. The legislative history suggested that
Article 2 as amended required all Egyptian law to conform to "the
26 As we will see below, this
principles of the Islamic shari'a."
interpretation was subsequently ratified, by the Supreme
Constitutional Court of Egypt.
D. DEBATES ABOUT WHETHER THE COURTS
COULD ENFORCE ARTICLE 2

The amendment of Article 2 was itself a significant symbolic
victory for Islamists. However, because a number of crucial issues
remained unresolved, it was impossible to predict the practical
impact of the amendment. Among other issues, the text of Article 2
did not make clear who had constitutional authority to identify and
interpret the principles of the Islamic shari'a and to determine

24. EGYPT CONST. art. 2 (1971).
25. See generally GILLES KEPEL, JIHAD: THE TRAIL OF POLITICAL ISLAM 80-88
(2002) (providing a brief overview of the Egyptian Islamist movement taking place
in the 1970s, which attracted students and played a pioneering role in the wider
movement later occurring throughout the Muslim world).
26. See LOMBARDI, supra note 20, at 132-35 (discussing the report of the
committee in charge of drafting the amendment and some of the debates in
parliament). For a discussion of the same report and debates, compare Hatem Aly
Labib Gabr, The Interpretationof Article 2 of the Constitution, in HUMAN RIGHTS
AND DEMOCRACY: THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF

supra note 12, at 217, 219; and Rudolph Peters, Divine Law or Man-Made
Law?, 3 ARAB L.Q. 231, 236 & n.20 (1988).
EGYPT,
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whether Egyptian legislation was in conformity with them.27 Were
the political branches free to interpret the principles of the Islamic
shari 'a as they thought best? Or did the courts have the final say on
whether legislation was consistent with these principles?
When it amended Article 2, the ruling party seems to have
assumed that the political branches alone would determine whether
Egyptian laws conformed to "the principles of the Islamic shari 'a."
According to the ruling party, Article 2 required the political
branches only to make their best efforts to Islamize the law and their
judgment could not be questioned. 28 By this interpretation, once new
codes had been drafted, the courts could not challenge the' political
branches' assertion that the laws were Islamic. Islamists naturally
had a different view. They asserted that Article 2 empowered and,
indeed, obliged the courts to determine whether Egyptian legislation
was consistent with the principles of the Islamic shari'a and, if it was
not, to strike it down.29
If the government had seemed in good faith to be pursuing a
policy of Islamization, its position might have had a certain appeal
for courts. However, by the early 1980s, the government had
obviously abandoned any good faith effort to Islamize the law. After
the assassination of President Sadat in late 1981 by disgruntled
Islamists, the new government of Husni Mubarak scuttled all plans
for Islamic legal reform.30 Thereafter, although the ruling party

27. See Bernard Botiveau, Contemporary Reinterpretations of Islamic Law:
The Case of Egypt, in ISLAM AND PUBLIC LAW 261, 277 (1993) (describing the
debate over the role for the Islamic shari'a during this period).
28. See BROWN, supra note 16, at 126 ("Few judges would question the
viability or legitimacy of the shari'a, but most would view it as a body of law that
informs (and places general restrictions on) positive law, as expressed in clear
legislative texts.").
29. See Clark B. Lombardi, State Law as Islamic Law in Modem Egypt: The
Amendment of Article 2 of the Egyptian Constitution and the Article 2
Jurisprudence of the Supreme Constitutional Court of Egypt 176 & n.27 (2001)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University) (referencing sources
identifying various cases in which Islamist lawyers asked the courts to void or
enjoin enforcement of various articles of the civil and penal codes).
30. In the late 1970s up through the middle of 1981, the Sadat regime claimed
to be actively moving towards some form of Islamization. The proof of that policy
was a program under the control of Sufi Abu Talib that was supposed to review
and revise Egyptian law to conform to shari'a. After the assassination of Sadat, the
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asserted that only the political branches had the right to determine
whether the obligation to harmonize Egyptian law with Islamic
shari'a had been met, it had become clear that the political branches
could not necessarily be trusted to make a good faith effort to
Islamize Egyptian law. Any court that declared Article 2 to be nonjusticiable would be seen as tacitly condoning the government's
violation of a constitutional command. What was the Court to do?
The SCC in 1985 issued a politically savvy opinion that resolved
the threshold question of justiciability.3" The Court's 1985 opinion
was peculiarly reasoned, but politically ingenious. The SCC held that
although it did not have jurisdiction to hear challenges to legislation
that was in force on the date that Article 2 was adopted, it did have
jurisdiction to hear challenges to legislation enacted thereafter-a
doctrine often described, somewhat misleadingly, as the doctrine of
the "non-retroactivity" of Article 2.32
government claimed that it would maintain its commitment to Islamization.
However, Sufi Abu Talib's program ceased to make any progress, and in 1985, it
was formally closed down. For a discussion of the government's apparent
commitment to Islamization and the sudden death of that commitment, see
LOMBARDI, supra note 20, at 129-39. Rudolph Peters has suggested three reasons
for what he calls the government's "volte-face": a "hardening" of attitudes toward
Islamists in the wake of the assassination of Sadat, a fear of sectarian clashes, and
concern about relationships with foreign donors (particularly the United States) on
whom the Egyptian economy increasingly relied. Peters, supra note 26, at 239. It
should be noted, however, that Enid Hill has argued the government never really
believed that Abu Talib would succeed in preparing Islamic codes and was thus
forced to squelch them when they appeared. Enid Hill, Law and Courts in Egypt:
Recent Issues and Events Concerning Islamic Law, in. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY
OF CONTEMPORARY EGYPT 240, 250-51 (Ibrahim M. Oweiss ed., 1990).
31. Rector of the Azhar Univ. v. President of the Republic, Case No. 20 of
Judicial Year 1 (Sup. Const. Ct. 1985), translated in 1 ARAB L.Q. 100 (Saba
Habachy trans., 1986).
32. The Court reasoned that Article 2 did not give the courts the power to
compel the legislature to enact a new law or amend a law that was already in force
on the date that Article 2 was amended in 1980. The SCC was barred, even
indirectly, from compelling such an action-for example, by voiding as un-Islamic
a law that was in force on the date that Article 2 was entered into force.
Paradoxically, however, Article 2 authorized the courts to review any laws that the
political branches voluntarily chose to enact or amend after Article 2 came into
force. As a practical matter, then, the SCC could not accept jurisdiction over any
Article 2 case (including, as it turned out, the case at bar) if it challenged as unIslamic a piece of legislation that antedated the amendment of Article 2. The Court
would, however, be empowered (and indeed was required) to review legislative
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At a time in which secularists and Islamists were engaging in
increasingly violent confrontations, this doctrine gave each side a
partial victory. It allowed the SCC to paint itself as a neutral arbiter.
At the same time, the decision had the beneficial effect of buying the
Court time to develop a method of interpreting the principles of the
Islamic shari'a.Most of the cases on the Court's docket involved

challenges to laws already in force at the time Article 2 was enacted
in 1980. Thus, the decision cleared the Court's docket of the case at
bar and the vast majority of Article 2 challenges then before the
Court.3 3

In short, without renouncing its authority to eventually exercise
Article 2 review, the SCC was able to postpone for several years the
day when the Court would have to identify, interpret and apply the
principles of the Islamic shari'a. This delay was fortunate because of
the difficulty inherent in articulating these principles.
E.WHAT WERE "THE PRINCIPLES OF THE ISLAMIC SHARI'A"?

Article 2 did not explain what it meant by the term "the principles
of the Islamic shari'a," and the legislative history did not provide
much guidance either.34 This lack of instruction created serious
problems for a court trying to interpret and enforce Article 2. These
enactments that were issued after the amendment of Article 2 in 1980. As a
practical matter, it was as ifArticle 2 were non-retroactive. Nevertheless, that is
not technically what the Court said. The Court accepted that Article 2 was
retroactive, but merely stated that cases involving laws enacted prior to the
amendment were non-justiciable. Id.
33. Nathalie Bemard-Maugiron has listed eighteen cases that the Court
dismissed on non-retroactivity grounds between 1985 and 1992. Of these, eight
(including the two 1985 cases) were already on the Court's docket at the time that
the doctrine of non-retroactivity was announced. See Nathalie Bernard-Maugiron,
La Haute Court constitutionelle tgyptienne et la shari'a islamique, 19 AWRAQ
110-11 (1998).
34. Indeed, the meaning of the amendment was debated both inside the drafting
committee and by outside commentators and political figures, but prior to
adoption, no consensus was reached on the precise implications of the various
formula considered. See, e.g., Minutes of the Preparatory Comm. for Drafting the
Const. for the Arab Republic of Egypt (1971) (on file with the library of the Majlis
al-Sha'b, Cairo); see also JAMAL AL-'UTAYFI, ARA' FI AL-SHARI'A WA-FI ALHURRIYYA [OPINIONS ON THE SHARI'A AND FREEDOM] (1980); Joseph P. O'Kane,
Islam in the New Egyptian Constitution: Some Discussions in al-Ahram, 26
MIDDLE EAST J. 137, 143-48 (1972).
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problems emerged because, over the course of the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries, the classical consensus on questions of Islamic
legal theory had broken down throughout the Muslim world. By the
late twentieth century, Muslims had come to champion a number of
very different theories of shari'a.Before it could try to identify and
apply the principles of the Islamic shari'a, the SCC would have to
consider a number of competing approaches to Islamic legal
interpretation. It would have to decide whether to adopt one of these
approaches or, instead, come up with a new approach of its own.

II. COMPETING METHODS OF ISLAMIC
LEGAL INTERPRETATION
Over the course of the twentieth century, consensus collapsed in
the Islamic world on the proper method of interpreting Islamic law.
In Egypt and some other countries, a number of very different
modernist approaches to Islamic legal interpretation had been
suggested. A number of these different approaches acquired
powerful supporters. Because Article 2, as amended, did not state
which of these very different methods should be used to identify and
interpret these principles,35 the Court would have to determine for
itself whether it would revert to classical methods of interpreting
shari'a,adopt one of the popular modernist approaches, or develop
its own new approach. The following discussion describes classical
Islamic legal theory and three modernist theories of Islamic
interpretation.
A. CLASSICAL METHODS OF INTERPRETING SHARI'A AND
DEVELOPING ISLAMIC STATE LAW

The first theory to which the Court could have looked was
classical Sunni Islamic legal theory.36 Before discussing classical
35. Classical jurists often talked about "rulings" (ahkam), rules (qawa'id),
roots (usut) or goals (maqasid) of shari'a, but almost never about principles
(mabadi '). The term "principles" was instead used in classical science, philosophy,
and theology. The use of this term in Article 2 suggested that the Constitution was
not importing specific classical rules, but rather larger principles that could be

induced from the entire tradition of Islamic law and legal theory.
36. For years, the history of usul al-fiqh was traced to the seminal work of
Muhammad Ibn Idris al-Shafi'i (d.204 A.H./820 C.E.). There is currently
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methods of legal interpretation, it is helpful to recognize that
classical Sunni legal theorists distinguished between three types of
ethico-legal norms: shari'a proper, fiqh, and Islamic state law.
Shari'a was God's law-the body of commands that God wants
people to obey. God had revealed some of these norms to prophets
such as Muhammad. After the death of the Prophet, no one had
perfect knowledge of these norms. Highly trained jurists could try to
understand them by studying scripture and logic, but they understood

that most of their conclusions were inherently fallible.
The science of interpreting shari'a was called 'ilm usul al-fiqh,
which might loosely be translated as "the science of the roots of
understanding God's law." 37 A scholar's interpretation of God's law

considerable dispute over the traditional account. Some have challenged the
attribution and dating of the work usually attributed to Shafi'i. The seminal work
arguing for a re-dating of the work was NORMAN CALDER, STUDIES IN EARLY
MUSLIM JURISPRUDENCE (1993). For a modified version of this argument, see
Christopher Melchert, Qur 'anicAbrogation Across the Ninth Century: Shafi 'i, Abu
'Ubayd, Muhasibi, and Ibn Qutaybah, in STUDIES IN ISLAMIC LEGAL THEORY 75,
75-98 (Bernard G. Weiss ed., 2002) (noticing changes over time in the attribution
of Risala to a follower of Shafi'i from almost a century later). Other modem
scholars have accepted the traditional attribution and dating, but question whether
the work was influential. See, e.g., Wael B. Hallaq, Was al-Shaft'i the Master
Architect of Islamic Jurisprudence?,25 INT'L J. OF MIDDLE EAST STUDIES 587,
587-605 (1993). Still others suggest that our focus on Shafi'i's work as the starting
point of the tradition is misplaced and that a full understanding of the development
of the tradition will require further research into other earlier works. E.g., Joseph
E. Lowry, Does Shaft'i Have a Theory of "FourSources" of Law?, in STUDIES IN
ISLAMIC LEGAL THEORY, supra, at 23, 23-50; Devin Stewart, Muhammad B.
Da'ud al-Zahiri's Manual of Jurisprudence: Al-Wusul ila Ma'rifat al-Usul, in
STUDIES IN ISLAMIC LEGAL THEORY, supra, at 99, 99-158.
37. This is because it sought to describe the roots (or "sources") (usul) in which
humans could find indications of God's law and describe the method by which
these roots could be interpreted. Continuing the arboreal metaphor, the substantive
rules that a jurist developed by interpreting these roots/sources were calledfuru',
the "branches" of God's law. As we will see, the SCC co-opts the idea of "roots"
and "branches," but it uses them in an idiosyncratic way. In its Article 2
jurisprudence, it distinguishes between precepts that constitute "roots" (usul) of
shari'a and those that constitute branches (furu), but it defines these terms
differently than the classicists. According to the SCC, the roots (usul) of shari'a
are substantive legal rulings (which would be considered furu' by the classicists).
These substantive rules are special, however, in that they are axiomatically known
to be valid in all places and at all times. All other substantive legal rules that jurists
derive are of only contingent validity and thus may, under appropriate
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was referred to as his fiqh (literally, his "understanding"). It was
understood that equally competent Muslim scholars could disagree in
their interpretation of a text or their expansion upon established
scriptural rules, and, if this occurred, it would be impossible to know
which scholar was correct. Thus, there might be at any one time
several competing bodies offiqh, and those who followed one body
offiqh did not consider the champions of another interpretation to be
heretics.
If there were competing, equally valid interpretations offiqh, how
could the state determine what rules to impose on its subjects?
According to classical scholars, the state could choose to apply as its
law one of the competing bodies of fiqh. Theoretically, the state
could also choose to apply statutes that were drafted by a ruler on
policy grounds, but were checked to ensure that they did not
contradict the evolving fiqh of Muslim scholars. Such statutes might
be considered "Islamic" statutes. Islamic statutes played only a minor
role in the pre-modern Islamic state. However, with the rise of
modem states in the Islamic world-states with centralized legal
systems that applied codified bodies of law-Islamic statutes became
an increasingly important part of the legal system in Islamic states.
In short, humans could not know with certainty what God had
commanded them to do in his shari'a. Trained scholars could,
however, come up with "rulings" (ahkam) which, taken together,
represented their fiqh-their interpretation of shari'a. State law
would have to be consistent with one of the orthodox juristic
interpretations of fiqh. The state did not have to hire a scholar to
derive a ruling for every situation that it wished to control. However,
it would ideally consult with scholars to ensure that the laws it
enacted and enforced were "consistent with" thefiqh of the scholars.
So how did jurists develop theirfiqh? Classical jurists recognized
two approaches to interpreting shari'a and developing fiqh: ijtihad
and taqlid.38 The preferred method was ijtihad. Nevertheless, for
reasons described, classical jurists came over time to rely more
heavily on taqlid.
circumstances, be dispensed with. It is these contingent rulings that the Court
refers to asfuru'.
38. See discussion infra Part II.A.1-2 (describing these different methods for
interpreting shari'a).
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1. ClassicalIjtihad
Performing ijtihad meant looking for knowledge about God's law
in four "sources": the Qur'an, the hadith literature, juristic logic
(qiyas) and juristic consensus (ijma ).39 The Qur'an represented a
transcription of the words God had revealed to the prophet
Muhammad. A hadith was an account of some event in the Prophet's
life. Because the Prophet was considered to have been protected
from sin, the stories of his words and deeds provided Muslims with
some further commands and a model of correct behavior. Thus,
many of these reports were collected in books-and a handful came
to be considered particularly trustworthy. The Qur'an and hadith
literature contained some clear commands and described prophetic
actions and statements that, if contextualized, seemed to imply a
divine command. The third source of knowledge was juristic logic,
which could help jurists better understand these commands and,
more importantly, expand upon them to address problems that were
not specifically addressed in scripture.4 ° The fourth source, scholarly
consensus, was a tool by which the community could establish some
interpretations of God's law as definitive and thus incontrovertible.41

39. This brings us to a point of nomenclature. Many classical jurists used the
term ijtihad to refer to the entire process of deriving rules from scriptures and
extrapolating logically from them. A minority of jurists, however, used the term
itihad more narrowly to refer exclusively to the second stage-the process of
deriving new rules through logical extrapolation. The Supreme Constitutional
Court of Egypt uses the latter, more restricted meaning of the term itihad. Without
approving or disapproving of this usage, we will adopt it here. Following the
Court, then, we will use the term "ijtihadi rules" exclusively to refer to rules that
have been derived by jurists who have extrapolated logically from rules that have
been confidently identified in texts. Ijtihadi rules, by this account, are the product
of human reason and are inherently fallible.
40. See, e.g., BERNARD WEISS, THE SPIRIT OF ISLAMIC LAW 22-23 (1998)

(explaining that Muslim juristic thought is based on the assumption that the law of
God is not "sent down from heaven as a finished product"); WAEL HALLAQ, A
HISTORY OF ISLAMIC LEGAL THEORIES 36-124 (1997) (recognizing the limits of the

scriptures and the development of other sources of Islamic law, including juristic
logic as a source of law).
41. See WEISS, supra note 40, at 22-23 (explaining that consensus provides
authority because the textual sources of law contain "few precisely worded rules of
law," and therefore it is up to jurists to provide clear statements of law).
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Ijtihad began with scriptural analysis. A scholar would look first
to the Qur'an. The Qur'an was considered axiomatically to be a
correct account of God's words as they had been recited by God's
angel to the Prophet Muhammad.42 Because the number of explicit
Qur'anic commands is limited, scholars often had to move to the
hadith literature. The hadith literature was a somewhat problematic
source of information about God's command. Classical jurists were
realistic about the possibility that eyewitnesses had misremembered
what they saw, or that some later Muslims might even have
fabricated stories about the Prophet's life.43 Scholars thus developed
critical methods of evaluating the trustworthiness of individual
hadiths.4 These methods relied primarily on analysis of the figures
who had related the account that was recorded in the hadith. Based
on their analysis, classical jurists expressed certainty about the
authenticity of a few hadiths.45 Many other hadiths were thought to

42. The Qur'an's authenticity was established through the fact that it was
validated by transmission through multiple eyewitnesses and down through
separate chains of authority. On tawatur, see Jeannette Wakin, Interpretationof the
Divine Command in the Jurisprudence of Muwaffaq al-Din Ibn Qudamah, in
ISLAMIC LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE

33,

33-52 (Nicholas Heer ed.,

1990)

(explaining tawatur (literally meaning "recurrence") as the process used to
demonstrate the authenticity of texts, where recurring transmissions through a
large number of individuals guarantee authenticity and eliminate doubts about the
conveyed information's validity); Bernard Weiss, Knowledge of the Past: The
Theory of Tawatur According to Ghazali, in STUDIA ISLAMICA 81, 81-105 (1985);
Aaron Zysow, The Economy of Certainty: An Introduction to the Typology of
Islamic Legal Theory 335-64 (1984) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard
University) (on file with author) (explaining the "epistemology of the cause," more
specifically the methods used to validate the nature and origin of laws); and
HALLAQ, supra note 40, at 60-68 (reviewing the necessary conditions for obtaining
certainty in the accuracy of a Prophetic report, and noting how jurists have
divergent views on the minimum number of message transmitters deemed
sufficient, although there is a general consensus that the minimum is five).
43. For a summary of some early jurists' concerns about the authenticity of
hadiths, see James Robson, Hadith, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ISLAM 23 (new/2d ed.)
[hereinafter E12].
44. The method was made up primarily by studying chains of transmissionlists of people starting with the eyewitness(es) and recording the persons over the
generations to whom the eyewitness had passed down the knowledge.
45. Only a few hadiths had a sufficient number of mutually corroborating
chains of transmission to be considered "mutawatir" and thus, like the Qur'an,
indubitably authentic. See generally Robson, supra note 43.
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have a high probability of being authentic. They were thus
considered presumptively correct and thus legally probative.4 6
Classical Islamic scholars did not only confront questions of
authenticity, but questions of interpretation as well. Acutely
conscious of the problems posed by linguistic ambiguity, classical
jurists considered only a few scriptural commands to be entirely
unambiguous and thus certain (qat'i)with respect to their meaning.
In many other cases, jurists could only identify a meaning that was
presumptively correct (zanni) with respect to its meaning.47
As the foregoing makes clear, a jurist who looked for evidence of
God's law in the scriptures had to evaluate both the authenticity of
the text and the clarity of the command.4 8 A small number of
scriptural commands were considered to be certain with respect to
49
both their authenticity and meaning (qat'ifi thubut wa-dalalatiha).
Others were certain (qat'i) with respect to one, but only
"presumptive" (zanni) with respect to the other. 50 It is crucial to note
that classical jurists believed that rules in this second tier were still
highly likely to reflect God's will and, in the absence of evidence to
the contrary, people accepted such rules as presumptively binding.51
The importance of this point will become clear shortly, when we
discuss modernist theories of Islamic legal interpretation. As will be
described below, modernist theories often depart from the classical
tradition and hold that humans are bound to respect classical
interpretations of Islamic law, only to the extent that these classical
interpretations follow inexorably from commands that are certain
with respect to both their authenticity and their meaning. 2
Furthermore, in areas of law where there is no scriptural text that is
certain with respect to both its authenticity and meaning, many of

46. Id.
47. See HALLAQ, supra note 40, at 36-40, 42-58.
48. See Zysow, supra note 42, at 90-91 (explaining how legal texts are divided
into four categories based upon their authenticity and the provided reference, and
those texts that are certain in both areas provide the most guidance).
49. Id.
50. Id.

51. Id.
52. See infra text accompanying notes 82-83.
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these modernists feel that they can (and should) use methods of legal
interpretation that rely heavily on non-scriptural sources of law such
as utility or custom. In short, the modernist rejection of the classical
jurists' respect for the previously established "presumptive"
interpretations of shari'a freed modernist jurists to develop
interpretations of shari'a that were heavily shaped by utilitarian
concerns or by respect for the evolving custom of a Muslim nation.
Modernist jurists with a utilitarian bent often justified their method
of legal reasoning by arguing that it was consistent with the classical
doctrine of the "goals of the shari'a."
Classical jurists recognized that trustworthy scriptures did not
provide rules to resolve every conceivable question. When faced
with a question that was not governed by a trustworthy scriptural
command, a classical jurist would have to derive a rule by expanding
logically from previously established scriptural commands. 3
Permissible methods of extrapolation constituted a fourth source of
law. Juristic logic was primarily analogical. Many jurists believed,
however, that consequentialist considerations should play a role in
the process of drawing proper analogies. 4 According to the classical
doctrine of the "goals of the shari'a" (maqasid al-shari'a), a
properly trained jurist could induce from scriptural commands a
number of divinely favored "interests" or "benefits" (maslaha, sing.;
masalih, pl.) that God's laws tended to promote.55 The achievement
of each interest was a "goal" (maqsad, sing.; maqasid, pl.) of the
law. 6 Most classical jurists agreed that shari'a recognized five
53. On qiyas, see HALLAQ, supra note 40, at 82-107 (reviewing legal reasoning
methodology collectively referred to as qiyas, the most important being analogical
reasoning); and WEISS, supra note 40, at 66-87.
54. See HALLAQ, supra note 40, at 83; see also SUBHI MAHMASSANI,
FALSAFAT AL-TASHRI' FI AL-ISLAM [The Philosophy of Jurisprudence in Islam] 7983 (Farhat J. Ziadeh trans., 1961).
55. A jurist could also identify results that the laws tried to prevent, each of

which were characterized as a "harm" (darr). Promoting a benefit or, conversely,
preventing a harm was said to serve the "goals of the shari'a."See HALLAQ, supra
note 40, at 112 (defining the goals as "protecting life, private property, mind,
religion, and offspring").
56. For examples of classical theorists, see, ABU HAMID AL-GHAZALI, ALMUSTASFA MIN 'ILM AL-USUL 284-315 (1970); MUHAMMAD KHALID MASUD,
SHATIBI'S PHILOSOPHY OF ISLAMIC LAW 127-68 (1995) (providing a detailed

analysis of recent studies of maslaha, maslaha in usul al-fiqh, and classical theorist

2006]

SHARI 'A AND CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION

401

particularly important interests/benefits: religion, reason, life,
progeny, and property. Some jurists added a sixth: honor ('ird)i'
These were said to have been recognized by consensus as the
"necessary" goals of the law; below these necessary goals stood less
important "interests/benefits." 5 8 Each scriptural rule of shari'a was
assumed to promote one or more interests. If a jurist wanted
confidently to develop a law by analogy to a scriptural ruling, he
would need to understand the interest that the underlying scriptural
ruling promoted. Having derived a rule that, he thought, was
analogous to the scriptural rule, he would check his conclusion by
asking whether the new rule would advance the same interest(s) as
the underlying scriptural rule.59 This meant that a rule derived by
analogy was of contingent validity. It ceased to be applicable
whenever circumstances changed so dramatically that it no longer
promoted effectively the goals that it was supposed to serve. 6°

Abu Ishaq al-Shatibi's analysis of the maslaha); Zysow, supra note 42, at 394-96;
HALLAQ, supra note 40, at 89-90, 92; and MALCOLM H. KERR, ISLAMIC REFORM:
THE POLITICAL AND LEGAL THEORIES OF MUHAMMAD 'ABDUH AND RASHID RIDA
(1966). For a general discussion of the doctrine in the works of later jurists, see
MUWAFFAQ AL-DIN IBN QUDAMA, RAWDAT AL-NAZIR WA-JUNNAT AL-MUNAZIR
86-87 (1385 A.H.); BERNARD G. WEISS, THE SEARCH FOR GOD'S LAW: ISLAMIC
JURISPRUDENCE IN THE WRITINGS OF SAYF AL-DIN AL-AMIDi 609-13 (1992) (citing
al Amidi); MASUD, supra, at 139-42 (detailing Amidi's exploration of the
objectives or goals behind the rules of law); and KERR, supra, at 69-70 (discussing
Qarafi).
57. On the addition of 'ird by some jurists, see Zysow, supra note 42, at 34344, 435, n.259. It should be noted that in contemporary usage, 'ird often is used to
refer to a woman's sexual virtue.
58. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
59. See generally Zysow, supra note 42, at 335-64 (detailing the methods used
to validate the nature and origin of the laws); HALLAQ, supra note 40, at 110-11
(addressing the requirement that the reasoning and purpose are clearly grounded in
the textual evidence).
60. Thus, as one late classical jurist wrote, the difference between textually
derived rules and logically derived rules was the difference between "universal
legal rules (al-shara'i' al-kulliyya), which do not change with the change of time"
and "particular [acts of] siyasa (al-siyasa al-juz'iyya) that are dependent upon
[considerations of] welfare, thus being limited by time and place." Mohammad
Fadel, Adjudication in the Maliki Madhhab: A Study of Legal Process in Medieval
Islamic Law (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1995) (citing
and translating Ibn al-Qayyim).
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Like scriptural rules that were of "presumptive" authenticity or
meaning, rules derived by analogy were not "certain" to be rules of
shari'a.It was accepted that qualified jurists would disagree about
the implications of a scriptural ruling, and thus that competing, but
equally orthodox opinions, might arise. Classical jurists believed,
however, that the Islamic community was divinely protected from
61
error, and thus would never agree on an incorrect legal conclusion.
Because of the doctrine of collective infallibility, classical theory
held that juristic consensus was the fourth source of knowledge about
God's law. It meant that a particular interpretation of Islamic law that
had once been considered merely "probable" was definitively correct
and no longer subject to question. The vast majority of legal thinkers
accepted that the consensus of all scholars in a single generation was
sufficient to establish the truth of a legal proposition. Some scholars,
however, accepted that only the consensus of the first generation of
Muslims could be trusted without question.
2. ClassicalTaqlid
Although reasoning from the four "sources" of law was the ideal
method of deriving fiqh, few jurists after the eleventh century
actually employed this method-choosing instead to reason from
precedent. By the twelfth century C.E., all jurists had come to be
associated with one of four mutually orthodox "guilds" of juriststhe Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi'i and Hanbali guilds.62 Almost all members
of these guilds (and thus almost all Islamic jurists) were thought to
be in a posture of taqlid, meaning that they were required to follow
the precedents laid down by the early masters of their guilds.6 3

61. See WEISS, supra note 40, at 114-18 (explaining that a jurist's authority
derives from the foundational texts and is an acceptable expression of the law of

God and thus infallible). For more on infallibalism, see Zysow, supra note 42, at
463-83.
62. On the development of the four schools, see CHRISTOPHER MELCHERT, THE
FORMATION OF THE SUNNI SCHOOLS OF LAW, 9TH-10TH CENTURIES C.E. (1997).
For the consolidation of competing schools and the ultimate triumph of the four
Sunni schools of law, see DEVIN J. STEWART, ISLAMIC LEGAL ORTHODOXY:
TWELVE SHIITE RESPONSES TO THE SUNNI LEGAL SYSTEM 25 (1998).

63. The trend away from reasoning from primary scriptural sources (ijtihad)
and towards precedential reasoning (taqlid) is reflected in the biographical and
legal literature by the decreasing references to mujtahids (scholars who practice
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Through sophisticated (and often creative) methods of precedential
reasoning-methods which are generally subsumed under the rubric
taqlid-juristsin a guild worked from the precedent of their guild to
develop the fiqh of their guild.64 Jurists in each of the four guilds
accepted the fiqh of other guilds as "orthodox"-meaning they did
not judge a Muslim to be a sinner simply because he followed the
doctrine of a rival guild." Indeed, so long as a Muslim followed the
doctrine of one of the guilds, he would probably go to heaven. In
short, it was generally understood (and accepted) that there would be
at any one time several competing and ever-evolving interpretations
of Islamic law, each of which was equally "orthodox. ' 66 Muslims
came to follow different interpretations of Islamic law-each
interpretation continuing to evolve under the supervision of a
different guild of jurists.
Could a state force its citizens to obey one of the competing,
equally orthodox versions? If so, which one should it select?
Initially, most jurists worked from the premise that state law would
be legitimate only if the state were headed by an extraordinary figure
who was descended from the Prophet, trained as a jurist, and

Ytihad) and the increase in references to muqallids (scholars who reason out law
through taqlid). For a survey of the literature, see Wael B. Hallaq, On the Origins
of the Debate About the Existence of Mujtahids and Gate of jtihad, 63 STUDIA
ISLAMICA 129, 129-41 (1986); Wael B. Hallaq, Was the Gate of Ijtihad Closed?,
16 INT'L J. OF MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES 3, 3-41 (1984); and WAEL B. HALLAQ,
AUTHORITY, CONTINUITY, AND CHANGE IN ISLAMIC LAW 86-120 (2001). In
reading these, please note that the mujtahid within a guild is bound by taqlid. On
this point, see SHERMAN A. JACKSON, ISLAMIC LAW AND THE STATE:
CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF SHIHAB AL-DIN AL-QARAFi 73-79 (1996).
Nevertheless, the idea that later scholars were less talented than their forbearers
was certainly a legal fiction. In fact, the most qualified muqallids were said to be
jurists who understood completely the method that their exemplars had used to
derive law through ijtihad-meaningthat theoretically, they should have been able
to perform ijtihadthemselves. For a discussion of this point, see, for example, id.
at 94-96.
64. STEWART, supra note 62, at 25.
65. See, e.g., BABER JOHANSEN, CONTINGENCY IN A SACRED LAW: LEGAL AND
ETHICAL NORMS IN THE MUSLIM FIQH 37-42 (1999). For a longer explanation of
the development of this doctrine and some of its ramifications, see LOMBARDI,
supra note 20, at 15-18, 45-46.
66. On this doctrine, and its ramifications for the development of classical
Islamic law, see JOHANSEN, supra note 65, at 39.
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possessed other exceptional qualifications. Such a ruler could impose
as law rules drawn from his preferred interpretation of shari'a.
Eventually, however, attitudes towards state law in the Islamic
Mediterranean came to be heavily influenced by the theory of siyasa
shar'iyya, which proposed a slightly different approach to
determining the legitimacy of a state's law.67
According to the doctrine of siyasa shar'iyya, Islamic society
could legitimately be governed by any "possessor of coercive power"
(wali al-amr). To ensure that his laws were legitimate, however, this
ruler would have to consult with classical Islamic jurists and would
have to ensure two things: (i) His edicts must not require Muslims to
perform acts that these jurists deemed forbidden (or abstain from acts
that the jurists deemed mandatory); (ii) His edicts. must not cause
general harm to society by impeding the goals that Islamic jurists
accepted as goals of the law.68

67. See, e.g., IBN

TAYMIYYA,

AL-SIYASA AL-SHAR'IYYA (1988). For a French

translation, see HENRI LAOUST, TRAITIt DE DROIT PUBLIC D'IBN TAIMIYA (1948),
and for an English translation, see OMAR FARUKH, IBN TAYMIYYA ON PUBLIC AND

PRIVATE LAW IN ISLAM (1966). For a detailed analysis of Ibn Taymiyya's thought,
see HENRI LAOUST, ESSAI SUR LES DOCTRINES SOCIALES ET POLITIQUES DE TAKID-DIN AHMAD B. TAIMIYA 278-318 (1939) [hereinafter LAOUST, ESSAI]; and ANN
LAMBTON, STATE AND GOVERNMENT IN MEDIEVAL ISLAM 144 (1981) (explaining

that Ibn Taymiyya "describes al-siyasa al-shar'iyya as a treatise on the general
principles of divine government and appointment to the lieutenancy of the prophet
and states that it was indispensable for the ruler and his subjects and for those in
charge of affairs" (Arabic terms omitted)).
68. Thinkers like lbn Taymiyya thus proposed that the proper role of shari'a
(as interpreted by the jurists) might be best conceptualized as creating an outer
boundary on the legislative power of the state. The jurists identified rules that
people could not be commanded to violate-and that must thus be reflected in state
law. The jurists could also identify social interests that state law must promote. So
long as he did not compel people to sin, the wali al-amr had significant discretion
to enact whatever legislation he thought would best advance society's enjoyment
of these benefits. As Frank Vogel puts it:
[B]y this doctrine, Ibn Taymiyya advances both a more expansive vision for
fiqh (among other things, embracing disputed doctrines by which fiqh draws
on utility) ... and also a constitutional theory by which the excesses of rulers

may be curtailed and Shari'a legitimacy extended to actual states. In effect,
his doctrine offers rulers Shari'a legitimation in return for a greater share -of
power for 'ulama'; it offers 'ulama' greater Shari'a efficacy at the cost of
their being implicated further in affairs of state.
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Classical legal theory, including the theory of siyasa shar'iyya,
had an enormous impact on the political philosophy of the Ottoman
state.69 Justifying its behavior in terms of this theory, the Ottomans
imposed as law both unwrittenfiqh and, increasingly, statutes, and in
part as a result, the empire enjoyed considerable popular legitimacy.
The ideal of siyasa shar'iyya came to influence Muslim thought
throughout the areas under Ottoman control, including Egypt.70
In sum, then, classical Islamic legal theory set out two highly
complex methods by which Muslims were supposed to interpret and
apply God's command. When state law was measured for conformity
with shari'a, it was measured against the interpretation that classical
jurists had developed using one of these two methods. As we will
describe shortly, however, some Islamic legal thinkers in the modern
era came to question the efficacy of the classical methods of Islamic
legal interpretation. They have thus proposed a number of new
methods for interpreting the shari'a. Some of these modernist
approaches to Islamic legal reasoning have had a strong influence on
the SCC's Article 2 jurisprudence.

Frank Vogel, Siyasa, in E12, supra note 43, pt. III ("In the Sense of Siyasa
Shari 'a").
69. For later Mamluk thinkers influenced by the theory, see Vogel, Siyasa, in
E12, supra note 43 (discussing Ibn Farhun's text, TABSIRAT AL-HUKKAM 12-13,
104-15 (Cairo, 1884). For Ottoman thinkers influenced by it, see id. (discussing alTarabulusi's text, Mu'IN AL-HuKKAM); and see also URIEL HEYD, STUDIES IN OLD
OTTOMAN CRIMINAL LAW 198 & n.4 (V. L. Menage ed., 1973) (discussing Dede
Efendi's legal theory).
70. For a discussion of the ways in which Ottoman thought came to influence
Egyptian legal thought, see Lombardi, supra note 29, at 54-55, 70-73; and see also
GALAL H. EL-NAHAL, THE JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION OF OTTOMAN EGYPT INTHE
SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 7-9, 71-73 (1979) (recounting the reorganization of the
Egyfptian administration after the Ottomans conquered Egypt, as well as the
implementation of the shari'a as law); BROWN, supra note 16, at 25 (explaining
that during the first three-quarters of the nineteenth century, the judicial structure
was not based entirely on shari'a, but the courts generally operated under a blend
of Ottoman qanun and Egyptian regulations and decrees, which was either based
on shari'a or did not contradict it); and Rudolph Peters, Sharia and the State:
CriminalLaw in Nineteenth Century Egypt, in STATE AND ISLAM 152, 152-57, 174
(C. van Dijk & A. H. de Groot eds., 1995) (tracing the connection between specific
criminal legislation in Egypt and the shari 'a).
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B. MODERNIST THEORIES OF ISLAMIC LAW AND
ISLAMIC LEGISLATION IN EGYPT

Over the course of the nineteenth and twentieth century, the
Ottoman province of Egypt gained independence. 7 As the new state
began to take shape, Egyptian intellectuals and government officials,
impressed by the legal systems of continental Europe, were coming
to favor statutory law over judge-made law-eventually deciding to
codify law. At the same time, social and intellectual changes
prompted a new class of intellectuals to re-examine traditional
assumptions about shari'a and its role in the state. Some thinkers
came to embrace secularism-the idea that statutory law would be
legitimate even if lawmakers did not attempt to ensure that the
statutes were consistent with shari'a norms. Modem Islamists, on the
other hand, continued to insist that a statute was legitimate only if it
72
was consistent with God's law.
Modem theorists have tended to uphold the essential premise of
siyasa shar'iyya. That is to say, they have asserted that shari'a is
known to contain both a number of universally applicable rules and a
number of general principles requiring that people promote divinely
favored social goals. State law will be legitimate if it respects both
the specific commands and the larger goals. As modem Islamic
thinkers have explored new ideas about textual criticism,
epistemology, and hermeneutics, they have developed new methods
of legal reasoning to identify the Islamic rules and goals against
which the law of the state should be measured. They have also
proposed specific methods of drafting legislation that were consistent
with these rules and goals.73 Three competing modem approaches
71. See Anna Jenefsky, Permissibility of Egypt's Reservations to the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of DiscriminationAgainst Women, 15
MD. J. INT'L L. & TRADE 199, 216 (1991) (explaining that Egypt achieved
independence from the Ottomans in 1874).
72. See, e.g., ALBERT HOURANI, ARABIC THOUGHT IN THE LIBERAL AGE: 1798-

1939, at 132-33 (1962) (tracing the influence of Muhammad 'Abduh, a proponent
of maintaining consistency between Islamic and state law); see discussion infra
Part II.B.2 (discussing the neo-ijtihad theory rooted in the work of Muhammad
'Abduh). For a more involved discussion, see Lombardi, supra note 29, at 69-77
(reviewing the political events of this time and the views that precipitated them).
73. See discussion infra Part II.B.1-3 (providing examples of various theories,
specifically those proposed by Rashid Rida and al-Sanhuri).
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became particularly influential over the course of the twentieth
century. Two of these seem to have significantly influenced the
SCC's understanding of Islamic law.
1. Neo-TraditionalApproaches to Islamic Legal Interpretation
Among the modem approaches to Islamic legal reasoning is one
that we might refer to as "neo-traditional." Neo-traditional
movements-as we define them-are movements asserting that the
authority to interpret shari'a is confined to classically trained
scholars. The guilds had collapsed as effective teaching and licensing
institutions in the nineteenth century.74 Nevertheless, the Egyptian
government took over and maintained the institutions of classical
learning that used to be controlled by the guilds, particularly the
prestigious university at the mosque of al-Azhar, whose graduates
held themselves out to be the intellectual heirs to the jurists
associated with the four classical Sunni guilds of law. After the
takeover, the graduates of this institution, though they studied the
traditional Islamic sciences, were not associated with a particular
guild, but rather with the aggregate tradition of exegesis. This
permitted scholars to propose variations on traditional methods of
Islamic legal reasoning and drafting Islamic statutes.75
What defines a theory as neo-traditional for the purposes of this
article is that it assumes that the most authoritative interpretation will
be carried out by a scholar who has received classical training and is
recognized as a member of the special class of scholar known as the
'ulama'. Thus, a state law will only be legitimate if it is approved by
a member of the 'ulama' or by a committee of members.7 6 It is

possible that some of those who drafted Article 2 were inclined

74. See

LOMBARDI,

supra note 20, at 67-69 and accompanying sources.

75. For example, many argued the state should not strive to ensure that its law
was consistent with the interpretation of a particular guild. Rather, the state should
simply ensure that each of its laws reflected a position taken by some scholar in the

past, thereby turning state law into a hodgepodge of rulings from different Sunni
guilds and even from non-Sunni scholars. See generally Wael B. Hallaq, Juristic
Authority vs. State Power: The Legal Crises of Modern Islam, 19 J.L. & RELIGION
243 (2003-2004).

76. On neo-traditional approaches to drafting statutes, see generally
supra note 20, at 80-83, 103-04, and accompanying sources.

LOMBARDI,
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towards neo-traditionalism and thus assumed that Article 2 required
the state to conform to al-Azhar's interpretation of Islamic law.
However, such an interpretation of the Article seems to have been
intolerable to the Supreme Constitutional Court of Egypt, which
wanted to maintain plenary control over the interpretation of Article
2 and therefore possess the sole authority to determine whether a law
violated Article 2. The Court thus drew inspiration from two
important modernist approaches to Islamic legal reasoning. Each
proposed a method of reasoning that did not absolutely require
classical Islamic training. The SCC drew upon classical legal theory
and upon these two modernist theories to develop a pastiche method
of Islamic legal interpretation. Employing this method without
regard to the 'ulama"s interpretation of Islamic law, the SCC has to
date developed a progressive body of modernist Islamic
jurisprudence.77
2. InterpretingShari'a Through UtilitarianNeo-Ijtihad
One influential Egyptian modernist theory of Islamic legislation
proposed that the Islamic state should develop legislation through a
method that might best be characterized as "utilitarian neo-ijtihad."
The roots of this approach go back to the work of the nineteenth
century Egyptian jurist and reformer Muhammad 'Abduh. 8
However, it was 'Abduh's disciple Rashid Rida who first tried to
articulate the method systematically.79 Rida proposed a new method
of (1) identifying the rules and goals of shari'a,and (2) developing
codifiable state legislation that served the public interest without

77. See discussion infra Part III (explaining the SCC's theoretical basis in
developing its own progressive form of Islamic jurisprudence).
78. See HOURANI, supra note 72, at 145-57 (providing an outline of the views
espoused by 'Abduh); KERR, supra note 56, at 123-52 (asserting that 'Abduh
possessed the view that "[i]t is not right reason or the lessons of history that lays
down the rules; it is Islam," but religion does not delegate the authority to make
political decisions, rather Islamic law and natural law coincide).
79. On the relationship between Rida and 'Abduh, see KERR, supra note 56, at
153-55 (tracing the philosophical influence of 'Abduh on Rida, specifically the
notion that natural law and human reason can provide guidance on the types of
behavior that "lead to worldly prosperity or failure").
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violating the established rules and goals of shari'a.80 He called his
method "ijtihad," but its tie to classical ijtihad was attenuated."
Rida asserted that the process of developing legislative rules
would ideally begin with a search for universally applicable rules
found in scriptural sources, which a state would have to incorporate
into its national law. Rida was not demanding, however, that states
ask their legislators to derive rules through classical ijtihadand enact
them as law. As we stressed above, classical jurists had looked for
rules that were certain or probable with respect to their authenticity
or meaning. Rida, on the other hand, held that the state only had to
respect rules that were absolutely certain with respect to their
authenticity and meaning.8" Theoretically, states also had to respect
rules on which there had been binding consensus. However, Rida
limited the number of cases in which a determination that there was
binding juristic consensus (ijma ) could establish the certainty (and
universality) of an otherwise uncertain rule.83 Between Rida's strict
textual standards and the limits he placed on the role of consensus, a
jurist adopting Rida's modernist approach would find few scriptural
rules that had to be incorporated into state law-far fewer rules than
the classical jurists.8 4
80. See HAMID ENAYAT, MODERN ISLAMIC POLITICAL THOUGHT 78-81 (1982)

(explaining Rida's contention that an Islamic political system was capable of
reconciling utilitarian goals with Islamic ideals by using a modem form of ijtihad

as a basis for the development of modem legislation).
81. See discussion supra Part II.A.1 (defining classical ijtihad as extracting
Islamic law through four distinct sources: the Qur'an, the hadith literature, juristic
logic, and juristic consensus).
82. See, e.g., RASHID RIDA, YUSR AL-ISLAM (1923), translated in HALLAQ,
supra note 40, at 218 (providing Rida's view that texts bearing "conclusive
evidence in both content and transmission" are binding because they lack
ambiguity, and no other evidence may override them unless it is a text of greater
weight or a widely accepted principle of shari'a).
83. Following a minority of classical jurists, Rida held that only the consensus
of the Prophet's companions could establish binding scholarly consensus. See
HALLAQ, supra note 40, at 216.
84. Indeed, because Rida advocated an idiosyncratic method of evaluating the
authenticity of hadiths, he actually found even fewer-most of which turned out to

be very general principles found to be derived from the Qur'an. Rida was skeptical
about the efficacy of traditional hadith criticism, which he considered too
formalistic. He was thus willing to challenge the authenticity of certain hadiths that
had traditionally been accepted as authentic, with the result that he accepted fewer
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Rida proposed a utilitarian method of developing "Islamic" rules
to apply in the many areas that were not governed by a scriptural
command. Following the idiosyncratic classical jurist Najm al-Din
al-Tufi, 85 Rida argued that the hadith "no harm and no retribution"
(la darar wa-la dirar) revealed a supreme utilitarian principle
commanding people to act in the service of public good.86
Furthermore, following Muhammad 'Abduh, Rida asserted that
humans could, with confidence, determine what was in their best
87
interest based on reason and the systematic observation of nature
Working from these two premises, Rida concluded that, when
there were no "universal" rulings on point, an Islamic state must
order people to act in a way that reason suggests will advance human
welfare (maslaha).8 Finally, whenever texts commanded people to
follow a course of behavior that reason reveals to be "harmful,"
people were obligated to ignore the supreme utilitarian command
requiring exceptions to be made in such circumstances. Rida's
utilitarian method of identifying Islamic norms and developing
Islamic legislation left tremendous discretion in the hands of rulers or
their legal advisors, who would have to determine whether a

hadiths as authentic than had traditional jurists. In this, Rida was following his
teacher Muhammad 'Abduh who, in a work edited by Rida, expressed some doubts
about whether one was really obliged to blindly accept the authenticity of a nonmutawatir hadith that seemed inconsistent with the Qur'an or inconsistent with

what reason told us was plausible. For a discussion of Rida's theories, see DANIEL
BROWN, RETHINKING TRADITION IN MODERN ISLAMIC THOUGHT 32-38, 97-98,

116-22, 129-41 (1996); and G. H. A. JUYNBOLL, THE AUTHENTICITY OF THE
TRADITION LITERATURE: DISCUSSIONS IN MODERN EGYPT 15-18, 21-63, 114-21,

139-52 (1969).
85. For a biography of al-Tufi, see al-Tuf, in 10 E12, supra note 43, at 588.
86. Rida published al-Tufi's treatise on maslaha in al-Manar, the magazine
that he edited, and recommended it to readers. See 9 AL-MANAR, at 745-70. For the
utilitarian nature of the conclusions that Rida took from al-Tufi, see generally
HALLAQ, supra note 40, at 217-19.
87. See, e.g., 9 AL-MANAR, at 216, translated in KERR, supra note 56, at 157
("Islam is the religion of natural disposition and cannot possibly contradict the
laws of creation, nor can its customs contradict those of nature, for everything is
from God.").
88. See KERR, supra note 56, at 190 and accompanying sources; see also

HALLAQ, supra note 40, at 218-19; KERR, supra note 56, at 194-95.
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proposed statute was "Islamic" largely on the basis of subjective
conclusions about utility.8 9
3. InterpretingShari'a Through ComparativeNeo-Taqlid
While Rashid Rida was articulating his new approach to Islamic
legal interpretation and legislation, a younger contemporary, 'Abd alRazzaq al-Sanhuri, was developing a very different approach. Like
Rida, Sanhuri insisted that the governments in majority Muslim
states should apply Islamic legislation-legislation drafted and
checked against certain universally applicable precepts of Islamic
law that promoted useful social goals. 90 Like Rida, Sanhuri rejected
the traditional classical approaches of deriving law. However,
Sanhuri's method of identifying the universally applicable precepts
and goals of Islamic law was quite different from Rida's. Rida
insisted that those who sought to understand Islamic legal principles
should use a radically reconceptualized version of ijtihad. Like
traditional scholars in the age of taqlid, however, Sanhuri implicitly
rejected Muslims' ability to understand ancient and obscure
scriptural texts. Thus, he rejected the idea that modern scholars
should go back to the early Islamic practice of reasoning directly
from these texts. Modern Muslims would instead follow in the
footsteps of the jurists in the guilds who practiced taqlid and seek
essential "Islamic" legal principles through examination of the later

89. For criticisms on this score, see, for example, Fazlur Rahman, Towards
Reformulating the Methodology of Islamic Law, 12 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 219,
223 (1979); and HALLAQ, supra note 40, at 224 ("[N]o amount of interpretation or
textual manipulation can affect or diminish [the universal and general norms']
presence in the Shari 'a."). If Islamic judges had used it to develop Islamic rulings
on a case-by-case basis, legal outcomes would have been extremely unpredictable.
However, Rida did not believe that it would be used in this way. Rather, it would
be used to draft rules that would be codified and applied consistently in courts.
Subjectivism had practical consequences. As some critics pointed out, it seemed to
leave citizens vulnerable to a state that was largely free to legislate as it saw fit.
For criticisms on this score, see, for example, Rahman, supra; and HALLAQ, supra
note 40, at 224. Interestingly, Rida implicitly recognized this and suggested that it
would make sense to have constitutional protections beyond those required by
Islamic law. See KERR, supra note 56, at 183. On Rida's political theory more
generally, see LAOUST, ESSAI, supra note 67, at 573-74; and ENAYAT, supra note
80, at 69-83, particularly 77-8 1.
90. See, e.g., 'ABD AL-RAZZAQ SANHURI, LE CALIFAT 580 n.7 (1938).
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exegetical tradition.91 Sanhuri's method of extracting laws from
precedent was very different from the traditional methods used by
classical jurists. If Rida's approach to deriving state law was a
radically modem form of neo-ijtihad, Sanhuri's was a radically
modem form of neo-taqlid.
Sanhuri's neo-taqlid was shaped by comparative legal approaches
that were being explored by European nationalist legal thinkers who
were involved in the process of developing codes of law for
European nation states. 92 Sanhuri tried to induce from the diverse
writings of the classical jurists a number of principles that had
explicitly or implicitly recurred in texts from different times and
places. 93 These principles represented the universally applicable law
that Muslims must accept and Islamic states were not to enact
legislation that was inconsistent with them. 94 Sanhuri was not simply
91. See id. at 580-81; see also ENID HILL, AL-SANHURI AND ISLAMIC LAW: THE
PLACE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF ISLAMIC LAW IN THE LIFE AND WORK OF 'ABD ALRAZZAQ AHMAD AL-SANHURI, EGYPTIAN JURIST AND SCHOLAR 1895-1971, at 5,
38-39 (1987).
92. See 'Abd al-Razzaq Sanhuri, Le droit musulman comme element de refonte
du code civil Ogyptien, 3 RECUIL D'ETUDES EN L'HONNEUR D'EDOUARD LAMBERT
621, 623 (1938); see also, e.g., HILL, supra note 91, at 39 (summarizing Sanhuri's
approach).
93. The drive to create a code of Islamic law through comparative legal
methods may have been influenced by nationalist legal theory. Comparative legal
methodology initially came to prominence during the rise of European nationstates. Nationalist political ideology assumed that certain populations that had been
divided politically in the past actually shared a common heritage. By comparing
and contrasting the bodies of law that had traditionally governed the various
peoples of the nation before their unification, comparative jurists distilled a
number of overarching principles of law, which were, it was said, the essential
legal principles of that nation. Cf KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KOTZ,
INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 50-62 (Tony Weir trans., 2d rev. ed.,
1987). See Amr Shalakany, Between Identity and Redistribution: Sanhuri,
Genealogy and the Will to Islamise, 8 ISLAMIC L. & SOC'Y 201, 207-14, 224-26
(2001), on the anti-formalist influences on Sanhuri.
94. As the former Ottoman provinces of the Middle East began to fragment
into nation states, Sanhuri modified his theory to make room for national variations
in Islamic law. For a general consideration of Sanhuri's thought and its evolution,
see HILL, supra note 91; Oussama Arabi, Al-Sanhuri's Reconstruction of the
Islamic Law of Contract Defects, 6 J. OF ISLAMIC STUDIES 153, 153-72 (1995);
Oussama Arabi, Intention and Method in Sanhuri's Fiqh: Cause as Ulterior
Motive, 4 ISLAMIC L. & SoC'Y 200, 200-23 (1997); Guy Bechor, 'To Hold the
Hands of the Weak': The Emergence of ContractualJustice in the Egyptian Civil
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saying that Muslims had to follow rules that had been ratified by
scholarly consensus (jma )-or at least not in any sense that the
classical jurists would have recognized. Classical theory held that
once the qualified jurists of a generation had reached consensus upon
a particular rule of shari'a,then later generations were required to
accept this rule as binding. Sanhuri was not concerned with
identifying specific rules ("x is required" or "y is prohibited") that
had been explicitly accepted by a particular generation. Rather, he
was scouring the exegetical literature trying to identify legal
principles that had been implicitly respected by Muslims at all times
during their history. These universally accepted principles might take
the form of specific rules of behavior; for instance, "under certain
circumstances, a husband is required to do 'x' for his wife." They
might also take the form of more abstract principles; for instance,
"under certain circumstances, a husband should do whatever is most
likely to promote result 'y."' Though he did not use the terms
"rulings" or "goals," one might argue that Sanhuri was trying to
identify in the Muslim legal tradition analogues both of the classical
jurists' universally applicable "rulings" of shari'a and of the
classical jurists' "goals" of the shari'a.
To the extent that Islamic or national principles did not dictate a
particular rule, the state was free-at least from an Islamic
perspective-to legislate as it saw fit. 95 Like Rida's version of neoijtihad, Sanhuri's version of neo-taqlid left legislators and/or judges
significant discretion to establish laws that advanced what they
considered just or socially beneficial.

Law, 8 ISLAMIc L. & Soc'Y 179, 179-200 (2001); and David Johnston, A Turn in
the Epistemology and Hermeneutics of Twentieth Century Usul al-Fiqh, 11
ISLAMIC L. & Soc'Y 233, 235, 266-68 (2004). Increasingly coming to believe that
Muslims were defined by their region as well as their religion, Sanhuri posited that
the law of a Muslim nation state should also reflect any norms that were essential
to that region. Accordingly, when hired to develop national codes, he also studied
legal writings unique to the territory in which the nation state was forming and
sought to include those too. Thus, when drafting the Egyptian Civil Code of 1949,
he induced not only Islamic principles from the classical tradition as a whole, but
also Egyptian principles induced from the statutes and court rulings that had
historically been applied in Egypt. See generally Shalakany, supra note 93.
95. For an analysis of this aspect of Sanhuri's thought, see HILL, supra note 91;
and Shalakany, supra note 93, at 230-35.
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C. COMPETING ISLAMIST POLITICAL FACTIONS AND THE EMBRACE
OF DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO ISLAMIC LEGAL INTERPRETATION

Over the course of the twentieth century, Egyptian Islamists who
wanted Egyptian legislation to be "Islamic" aligned themselves with
different approaches to Islamic legal interpretation, and thus they
demanded very different types of Islamic legal reform. Some
Egyptians were enamored with neo-traditional theories, insisting that
the 'ulama' should identify the rules and goals that state legislation
had to respect. Increasingly, the most powerful Islamist factions
explicitly embraced modernist ideas. For example, the ideologues of
the Muslim Brotherhood, such as Hassan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb,
were inspired by Rashid Rida's idea of state legislation developed
through utilitarian neo-ijtihad.96 Many members of the legal academy
and legal profession, on the other hand, were drawn to Sanhuri's call
for state legislation to respect principles induced from a study of the
evolving Islamic legal tradition. Sanhuri became a prominent
professor and judge, and was ultimately appointed lead draftsman for
the hugely influential Egyptian Civil Code.97 As Baber Johansen has
pointed out, his ideas have continued to this day to influence the
thought of legally trained Islamists.98
By the time Article 2 was amended in 1980 to make "the
principles of the Islamic shari'a" the chief source of legislation,
Egyptians disagreed deeply about how a court should identify these
principles-and thus about what they required. Once it decided that
Article 2 cases were justiciable, the SCC had to carefully consider
the method that it should use to identify and interpret the shari'a
norms to which state legislation was to conform.

96. See Lombardi, supra note 29, at 104-08; see also discussion supra Part
II.B.2 (explaining Rashid Rida's version of utilitarian neo-ijtihad).
97. For Sanhuri's biography, see generally
supra note 93, at 201-44.
98. JOHANSEN, supra note 65, at 59.

HILL,

supra note 91; and Shalakany,
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III. THE SCC'S METHOD OF INTERPRETING
SHARI'A AND IDENTIFYING THE PRINCIPLES
THAT STATE LAW MUST RESPECT
In its Article 2 jurisprudence, the SCC has had to work with
competing approaches to Islamic legal interpretation to establish its
own official method. To understand the choices that the SCC made
when it articulated and applied its theory, it helps to understand a
little bit about the SCC and its commitment to the liberal rule of law.
A. THE SUPREME CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF EGYPT
In the 1980s, the judiciary in Egypt was recovering from years of
executive pressure and reestablishing its independence. The justices
of the SCC were an unexpected but important force in this process.
Under the regime of Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir, the Egyptian courts had
lost much of their independence. 99 In the 1970s, the ruling party
worked to establish a new constitutional court-the Supreme
Constitutional Court-which henceforth would be the only court
with the power to void Egyptian legislation as unconstitutional.10 0
The ruling party planned to establish a court with limited safeguards
that would be subservient to the executive.10 Reasserting itself, the
99. See BROWN, supra note 16, at 84-92 (discussing the Nasirist attempt to
subdue the judiciary through "presidential decree laws" limiting judicial
independence and the creation of new legal bodies, which provided Nasir with
significant control over the judiciary).
100. Since the 1930s, Egyptian courts had occasionally asserted (but had not
vigorously pursued) a right of constitutional review. See generally Enid Hill,
Establishing the Doctrine of JudicialReview in Egypt and the United States, in
THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY IN THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (Eugene
Cotran & Adel Omar Sherif eds., 1997). Even the idea that judges might overturn
legislation, was distasteful to Nasir and his successors. In 1969, the government
formed by presidential decree a Supreme Court with exclusive jurisdiction over the
constitutionality of legislation. The 1971 Constitution then created a constitutional
requirement that such a court become part of the Egyptian governmental structure.
101. Nasir's new court was not given strong guarantees of independence. See,
e.g., BROWN, supra note 16, at 61-92. See generally Nathalie Bernard-Maugiron &
Baudouin Dupret, Introduction to EGYPT AND ITS LAWS xxviii-xxix (Nathalie
Bemard-Maugiron & Baudouin Dupret eds., Arab & Islamic L. Series No. 22,
2002). The 1971 Constitution was enacted after Nasir's death, but it
institutionalized some of the residue of Nasir's distaste for judicial power. It gave a
constitutional basis for a constitutional court that had already been created. This
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judiciary succeeded in ensuring that the new court had guarantees of
independence. 11 2 Thereafter, to the delight of the judiciary, the new
SCC proved to be remarkably aggressive in exercising constitutional
review and imposing supra-legislative norms on the political
branches. 0 3 The SCC was committed to a philosophy of legal
recently created constitutional court had been established partly to ensure that
critical matters (including judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation)
would be kept out of the hands of the regular judiciary. The Constitution provided
that this Court would be established and regulated pursuant to implementing
legislation enacted by a parliament. This parliament was, of course, under the firm
control of the ruling party, and thus, the government of Anwar Sadat assumed that
it would be able to keep the parliament from granting the new constitutional court
any real independence. See id.; see also Tamir M. Moustafa, Law Versus the State:
The Expansion of Constitutional Power in Egypt, 1980-2001 (2002) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Washington); Bruce Rutherford, The Struggle for
Constitutionalism in Egypt: Understanding the Obstacles to Democratic Transition
in the Arab World (1999) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University).
102. During the 1970s, the judiciary fought successfully to ensure that the new
constitutional court would have some independence from the executive and
legislature. When the implementing legislation for the new constitutional court was
finally passed in 1979, it established a surprisingly independent Supreme
Constitutional Court. See Statute of the Supreme Constitutional Court, Law No. 48
of 1979, translated in HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY: THE ROLE OF THE
SUPREME CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF EGYPT, supra note 12, at 323-39. As
established, the Court has a specialized, primarily constitutional jurisdiction. For a
summary of the court's duties, see Awad Mohammad EI-Morr et al., The Supreme
Constitutional Court and Its Role in the Egyptian Judicial System, in HUMAN
RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY: THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME CONSTITUTIONAL COURT
OF EGYPT, supra note 12, at 37, 37-60; and Adel Omar Sherif, Constitutional
Adjudication, in EGYPT AND ITS LAWS, supra note 101, at 325, 325-44 [hereinafter

Const. Adjuducation]. When a court determines that a legitimate constitutional
issue arises in the course of a normal legal case, the court with jurisdiction is
required to refer the case to the SCC for disposition. Const. Adjudication, supra, at
329-38; Adel Omar Sherif, An Overview of the Egyptian JudicialSystem, and Its
History, 5 Y.B. OF ISLAMIC & MIDDLE E. L. 17, 19-20 (1998-1999) [hereinafter An
Overview]. See BROWN, supra note 16, at 102-03, for a discussion of the politics
surrounding the laws establishing working procedures for the Court, and an
analysis of the safeguards designed to protect the Court's independence. For a
complete discussion of the structure of the Court and the way in which its judges
are appointed and monitored, see An Overview, supra, at 17.
103. There is a large literature on the SCC and many works point out this
intriguing quality. See, e.g., the articles printed in HUMAN RIGHTS AND
DEMOCRACY: THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF EGYPT,
supra note 12; and THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY IN THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS, supra note 100; see also BROWN, supra note 16, at 102-26; Tamir

Moustafa, Law Versus the State: The Judicializationof Politics in Egypt, 28 L. &
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liberalism, which strongly protected negative liberties in the areas of
economic regulation and human rights. 10 4 Indeed, with respect to the
latter, the SCC interpreted the Constitution's rule of law provisions
to incorporate into the Egyptian Constitution a requirement that the
government respect international human rights norms. 105 As a new
court seeking to establish its independence from (and power over) an
authoritarian executive, the SCC was concerned about its public
reputation. Interested in ensuring that its interpretation of Article 2
would be accepted by the public, the SCC needed to develop an
approach to Islamic legal interpretation that would be respected by a
wide range of people-including a wide range of Islamists. At the
same time, the SCC seemed eager to see whether it could interpret
shari'a principles in a manner that was consistent with the liberal
rule of law, including the protection of international human rights. It
was a challenging assignment, and the SCC developed its theory
slowly and incrementally.
The SCC issued its first Article 2 opinion in 1989, striking down a
law in part on the grounds that it was inconsistent with the principles
of the Islamic shari'a.106 Even then, the Court mentioned the Article
2 issue in passing, without explaining how it had developed its
interpretation. It was not until 1993 that the SCC issued a detailed
opinion describing a theory of Islamic law and the basic outlines of

SOC. INQUIRY 883, 883-927 (2003); Const. Adjuducation, supra note 102, at 325-

44.
104. On the SCC's cases involving economic rights, see, for example, Awad
Mohammad El-Morr, The Status and Protection of Property in the Constitution, in
HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY: THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME CONSTITUTIONAL

COURT OF EGYPT, supra note 12, at 115, 115-27; Enid Hill, The Supreme
ConstitutionalCourt ofEgypt on Property, EGYPTE MONDE ARABE, No. 2 of 1999,

at 55; and Const. Adjudication, supra note 102, at 325-44.
105. See Case No. 22 of Judicial Year No. 8 (Sup. Const. Ct. 1992). For
discussions of the case and its ramifications, see Adel Omar Sherif, Unshakeable
Tendency in the Protection of Human Rights: Adherence to International
Instruments on Human Rights by the Supreme Constitutional Court of Egypt, in
THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY IN THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note
100, at 35, 37-38; JOHANSEN, supra note 65, at 367-68; and Kevin Boyle, Human
Rights in Egypt: InternationalCommitments, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY:
THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF EGYPT,

87.
106. See Case No. 68 of Judicial Year 3, 4 S.C.C. 335 (1989).

supra note 12, at
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its approach to Islamic legal interpretation. 11 7 In its opinions since
1993, the SCC has combined different approaches to Islamic legal
interpretation in order to develop a method of interpretation that will
be rhetorically attractive to a range of Islamists. At the same time,
the SCC has articulated the theory in such a way that it leaves itself
considerable discretion to interpret Islamic law in light of its basic
assumptions about justice and social utility. Not surprisingly, it has
exercised its discretion to develop a liberal interpretation of shari'a.

B. THE SCC's THEORY OF ISLAMIC LAW
1. Overview
Drawing upon both the classical doctrine of siyasa shar'iyya'0 8 and
Rashid Rida's modernist theory,10 9 the SCC interprets Article 2 to
require the state to develop laws that meet two criteria: (1) they must
be consistent with universally applicable scriptural rules of Islamic
shari'a, and (2) they must advance the goals of the shari'a.11° In
developing a method of identifying these rules and goals, the Court
has effectively created a pastiche of modernist approaches to
identifying the universal rules and goals of shari'a that state law
must respect.
2. Identifying the Rules of Shari'a Which a State Must Respect
When the SCC tries to identify the rules of shari'a that the state
must not contravene, it begins by looking for scriptural rules. In its
quest for these rules, it departs from the classical tradition (and
follows Rida) by searching only for principles that are "absolutely

107. See Case No. 7 of Judicial Year 8, 5-2 S.C.C. 265 (1993); see also BernardMaugiron, supra note 33, at 101-41 (describing the early cases).
108. See supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text (introducing the theory of
siyasa shar'iyya,meaning "state action within the bounds of the shari'a").
109. See supra notes 79-89 and accompanying text (explaining Rashid Rida's
modernist theory of utilitarian neo-ijtihad).
110. See, e.g., Case No. 7 of Judicial Year 8, 5 S.C.C. at 283-84; Case No. 29 of
Judicial Year 11, 6 S.C.C. 231, 249-51 (1994); Case No. 8 of Judicial Year 17, alJarida al-Rasmiyya [Official Gazette] 1026, 1031-32 (Sup. Const. Ct. 1996),
translatedin Brown & Lombardi, supra note 7, at 446-47.
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certain with respect to both their authenticity and meaning.""'
Intriguingly, the SCC does not seem to follow faithfully Rida's
method of establishing textual authenticity or the meaning of a text.
With respect to establishing textual authenticity, one cannot say
much about the SCC's method. The justices accept the Qur'an as
authentic. Beyond this, however, they have not described, even
obliquely, their method of separating the absolutely trustworthy
hadiths from the merely probable.
When determining whether a scriptural text has an unambiguous
meaning, the SCC fuses Rida's method with Sanhuri's." l2 Like Rida,
the SCC begins with a direct textual analysis of the scriptural
passages that seem to be on point.' Unlike Rida, however, the Court
regularly seeks confirmation of outward meaning through an
inductive survey of classical juristic writing over the years. That is to
say, the Court surveys juristic literature to see whether the jurists
consistently applied whatever law seems to have been established in
the passage. If not, the Court finds strong evidence that they did not
agree on the rule in question.1' 4 The SCC's method of identifying
legally binding scriptural rules thus fuses classical scripturalism
and/or Rida's scripturalism with Sanhuri's insistence that states are

111. See, e.g., Case No. 7 of Judicial Year 8, 5 S.C.C. at 283; Case No. 29 of
Judicial Year 11, 6 S.C.C. at 249; Case No. 8 of Judicial Year 17, at 1031,
translatedin Brown & Lombardi, supra note 7, at 446.
112. See discussion supra Part II.B.2-3 (articulating both Rida's theory of
utilitarian neo-ijtihadand Sanhuri's theory of comparative neo-taqlid).
113. See, e.g., Case No. 7 ofJudicial Year 8, 5 S.C.C. at 283-84; Case No. 29 of
Judicial Year 11, 6 S.C.C. at 250-51; Case No. 8 of Judicial Year 17, at 1035,
translatedin Brown & Lombardi, supra note 7, at 452-53.
114. See, e.g., Case No. 7 of Judicial Year 8, 5 S.C.C. at 284; Case No. 8 of
Judicial Year 17, at 1035, translated in Brown & Lombardi, supra note 7, at 453.
One should stress that the Court is not here adopting the classical doctrine of

qma'-the doctrine discussed above, which allowed jurists to establish the
meaning of a law through scholarly consensus. Rather, it is adopting a method of
reasoning from modem comparative legal methodology. First, the Court is not
accepting as binding the rules on which the scholars of a single generation (or the
first generation of Muslims) had agreed upon. Second, in looking for "agreement,"
the Court does not require unanimous acceptance. Rather, like Sanhuri, it looks for
trends that reveal themselves over the course of many generations. Cf Johnston,
supra note 94, at 268 (stating that there were three stages in the development of
consensus, which developed throughout the course of various generations).
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only obliged to respect those principles that have been consistently
accepted by a critical mass of traditional jurists over the centuries.
Because a scriptural command is not binding unless it is absolutely
certain with respect to both authenticity and meaning, one would
expect the Court to find few such binding scriptural precepts. This
turns out to be true. The Court has found only a few precepts that it
deems absolutely clear with respect to both authenticity and
meaning.115 Furthermore, the precepts that it has so far uncovered
have tended to take the form of fairly general principles. To apply
these principles in specific cases, an interpreter must still make some
judgment calls. For example, in the case that is translated following
this article, the Court states that an indubitably authentic Qur'anic
text clearly commands women to "cover" themselves.116 What
"cover" means in practice, however, is ambiguous. Accordingly, the
political authorities have enormous discretion to set rules for
"covering" as they think best, so long as the justices accept that the
rules would not impede people's ability to realize the goals of the
law. 117 In fact, the Court has apparently never struck down a law on
the grounds that it facially violates a rule that is absolutely certain
with respect to both its authenticity and meaning. Though the Court's
reasoning in some cases is opaque, it seems that whenever the Court
has declared a law to be inconsistent with the principles of the
Islamic shari'a, it has done so because it considered the law in
question to be inconsistent with the larger "goals of the shari a."118

115. See, e.g., Case No. 35 of Judicial Year 9, 6 S.C.C. 331, 350 (1994) (holding
that the Qur'an grants men an absolute right to marry up to four wives provided
that the taking of a wife does not harm any existing wife).
'116. See Case No. 8 of Judicial Year 17, at 1035, translated in Brown &
Lombardi, supra note 7, at 452-53 ("The Exalted One has said: 'Let them draw
their veils (khumur) over their bosoms;' 'Let them not reveal their adornments
except what is outward[ly apparent];' 'Let them draw close their cloaks;' and 'Nor
let them stamp their feet so that their hidden adornments may be known."').
117. See, e.g., Case No. 8 of Judicial Year 17, at 1035, translated in Brown &
Lombardi, supra note 7, at 456-57.
118. See, e.g., Case No. 6 of Judicial Year 9, 6 S.C.C. 542, 560-61 (1995)
(holding that a law forcing landlords to continue renting to the extended family of
deceased or departed tenants created more harm than good and thus violated the
general utilitarian command to the government requiring "acceptance of the
specific harm in order to repel a general harm").
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3. Identifying the Goals of Shari'a that a State Must Respect
As a practical matter, then, the most important part of the SCC's
method of interpretation is its method of determining whether a law
under Article 2 review serves the "goals of the shari'a." In most
Article 2 cases, the discussion concerning the goals of the law tends
to be very confusing. For one, the SCC seems to consider two very
different types of goals. The first are goals that the Court believes
specific types of law should promote: custody laws are supposed to
promote the well-being of the child; divorce laws protect the wellbeing of the wife; veiling laws are supposed to promote modesty, and
so forth. The second are goals that all laws must promote--or at least
must not impede. To be consistent with the goals of the law, a law
must both advance the specific goals that laws of its type are
supposed to promote and must not impede in a serious way society's
ability to realize the results that God wants society to enjoy more
generally. Although the SCC does not have any consistent
nomenclature that distinguishes between the two types of goal, we
will distinguish between "specific goals" and "general goals."
To identify the specific goals that a certain type of law is supposed
to promote and to determine whether a law does, in fact, promote
them, the SCC draws in part upon the classical doctrine of the
"goals" of the law.I19 To begin, the Court seems to adopt the classical
assumption that shari'a has a paramount concern with five human
interests, which overlap with, but do not mirror exactly, the classical
"necessaries.""12 The SCC then tries to determine which of these
necessaries, if any, is most likely the goal that this type of legislation
is supposed to promote. If it cannot find a "necessary" that the law
promotes, it looks to see whether it can identify any other result that
this type of law may be designed to promote. To determine this, the
Court not only looks for clues in the scriptural passages that address
regulations, but it also performs an inductive survey of the classical
119. See, e.g., Case No. 7 of Judicial Year 8, 5 S.C.C. at 283; Case No. 29 of
Judicial Year 11, 6 S.C.C. at 250; Case No. 35 of Judicial Year 9, 6 S.C.C. at 350;
Case No. 8 of Judicial Year 17, at 1032, translatedin Brown & Lombardi, supra
note 7, at 448 & n. 17.
120. See, e.g., Case No. 7 of Judicial Year 8, 5 S.C.C. at 283; Case No. 29 of
Judicial Year 11, 6 S.C.C. at 250; Case No. 8 of Judicial Year 17, at 1032,
translatedin Brown & Lombardi, supra note 7, at 448.
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jurists' interpretation of these verses. 2 ' In other words, the SCC tries
to identify the overarching human interest that all classical jurists
seem to have agreed shari'a was trying to promote. 2 2 Thus, to
identify the specific goals of the law, the Court is performing some
sort of hybrid of classical goals analysis and Sanhuri's comparative
interpretation.
However, the "specific goals" are not the only goals that must be
taken into account. The Court seems to be convinced that, as a
general rule, God wants people to enjoy whatever reason reveals to
be beneficial. Thus, alongside the requirement that laws advance the
specific goals that they are supposed to serve is a requirement that
the law not harm society. We will refer to this as the requirement that
the law serve the "general goals" of the shari 'a. Not surprisingly, the
SCC justifies its embrace of rationalist utilitarianism in much the
same way that Rashid Rida did. It states that it must give effect to the
unambiguous, utilitarian principle announced in the hadith, namely
"no harm and no retribution" (la dararwa-la dirar).123
There is a subtle relationship between the specific goals (which are
determined through textual analysis and an analysis of history) and
the general goals (which are derived by reason). To begin, the SCC
looks to the general goals when the specific goals of the law are
open-ended. That is to say, the specific goal of a law may be
advancing the welfare of children. If so, what constitutes welfare?
Welfare will be defined as the promotion of the general goals of the
121. See, e.g., Case No. 29 of Judicial Year 11, 6 S.C.C. at 255; Case No. 8 of
Judicial Year 17, at 1035-36, translatedin Brown & Lombardi, supra note 7, at
453-54.
122. On close inspection, the SCC does not hew strictly to the classical
understanding of the necessaries. The SCC does not include, as most classical
jurists did, "progeny" in its list of necessaries. It does, however, include
"honor/modesty" ('ird) which only a few jurists accept as a necessary. Compare
supra text following note 56 (listing the goals articulated in the classical sources),
with Case No. 7 of Judicial Year 8, 5 S.C.C. at 283, and Case No. 8 of Judicial
Year 17, at 1032, translated in Brown & Lombardi, supra note 7, at 448 (listing
the general goals of the shari'a articulated by the SCC: to protect religion, life,
reason, honor, and worldly goods).
123. See, e.g., Case No. 35 of Judicial Year 9, 6 S.C.C. at 354; Case No. 29 of
Judicial Year 11, 6 S.C.C. at 254. Even when it does not explicitly cite this hadith,
it uses language to make clear that it is determining the Islamic-ness of a law by
balancing harms. Cf Case No. 6 of JudicialYear 9, 6 S.C.C. at 561.
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law-namely, whatever our reason tells us is beneficial. Second,
there may be a case in which the Court finds no specific goal that
shari'a requires certain types of law to serve. Those types of law
must still, however, promote the public welfare. Finally, the Court
suggests that axiomatically, it will find a law inconsistent with "the
principles of the Islamic shari'a"if it leads to results that the Court
1 4
believes to be gravely harmful. 1
In short, the SCC in its goals analysis seems impressionistically to
balance: (i) the classical idea that shari'a seeks to promote five
necessary human interests above all others with (ii) the apparent
policy priorities of the texts (as derived through a plain meaning
analysis) and of the early jurists (as determined through a Sanhuriesque analysis) and (iii) a Rida-esque commitment to promoting
legal outcomes that reason suggests are just and socially beneficial.
The SCC's goals analysis is not a purely utilitarian analysis.
Nonetheless, it permits (and arguably requires) judges sometimes to
check legislation against norms that reflect their understanding of
patterns in traditional Islamic reasoning, and it tempers their
conclusions at all times by checking them against rationally derived
conceptions of "justice" and/or social utility. In dicta, the SCC has
argued that Islamic law is, for constitutional purposes, a source of
general moral principles that must be interpreted anew in every day
and age and must take evolving notions of human welfare into
account. 25 The embrace of this open-ended type of reasoning permits
decisions to turn on subjective conclusions about utility and permits
judicial intrusion into policy-making.

124. For example, in Case No. 8 of Judicial Year 17, the Court asserts that in
seeking to promote the "necessary" human interest in honor/modesty, the Egyptian
government (the "wali al-amr" of Egypt) was correct to be promoting modest dress
only to the point where it imposed upon the psychological well-being of women
and their ability to earn a living. The conclusion seems to be rooted, at least to
some degree, in the justices' assumptions about women's roles in society and
about women's feelings. Case No. 8 of Judicial Year 17, at 1036, translated in
Brown & Lombardi, supra note 7, at 454.
125. See, e.g., id. at 1032-33, translatedin Brown & Lombardi, supra note 7, at
447-48 (stating that the rulings of the Islamic shari'a develop and change
according to time and place to confront different events, guaranteeing flexibility
and vitality).
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The SCC could have taken concrete steps to limit the potential for
judicial legislation by asserting that the courts must defer to the
political branches' reasonable judgments about the utility of a law.
Intriguingly, the justices have not taken such steps. They have been
ambiguous about how much deference they will give to legislative
and executive policy judgments. Admittedly, in the vast majority of
cases, the Court seems to have agreed with the political branches'
judgment about the utility of a law, and one suspects that the SCC
might be giving some degree of deference. 126 However, the Court has
never explicitly said that it must defer to the political branches.
Furthermore, in some cases it has struck down laws on "goals"
grounds-after balancing the benefits and harms of the law and
concluding the laws were fundamentally unjust to some segment of
127
society.
Looking at the SCC's cases as a whole, it seems that the SCC has
taken advantage of the flexibility in its theory and has tried to ensure
that for the purposes of Egyptian constitutional law, the shari'a .will
be interpreted to be consistent with (and indeed to reinforce) the
Court's established commitments to liberal economic philosophy and
to the protection of certain civil and political rights-particularly
women's rights.
The SCC's Article 2 opinions consistently suggest that "justice"
requires people to respect each other's human rights (as understood

126. In a few cases, the Court's language even suggests, indirectly, that in cases
where reasonable people could disagree, the government is free to legislate as it
sees fit. See, e.g., Case No. 8 ofJudicial Year 17, at 1038, translated in Brown &
Lombardi, supra note 7, at 456-57 ("The wali al-amr has-in disputed questionsthe right [to perform his own] Ytihad to facilitate the affairs of the people and

reflect what is correct from among their customs and traditions, so long as they do
not contradict the universal goals of their shari'a (al-maqasid al-kulliyya li-

shari'atihim). [These universal goals] are not violated by the wali al-amr-acting
in the sphere of his capacities-in regulating girls' dress. For there should be no

revealing of her 'awra or legs, nor any informing about her body. There should be
no revealing her features in a way that repudiates modesty. And the Decision aims
at this [result] when it obliges each female pupil associated with one of the
stipulated educational stages to wear an appropriate uniform, which screens .her
without revealing her and which covers her nakedness and display of charms.").
127. See, e.g., Case No. 6 of Judicial Year 9, 6 S.C.C. at 560-61 (concluding
that the government wrongly calculated the benefits and harms of a landlord-tenant

law).
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by the international human rights community), and that the
enjoyment of these rights is an essential aspect of human welfare.
Thus, laws which impose upon international human rights are
inconsistent with human welfare and justice and thus with the
general goals of the shari'a. Working from this assumption, the SCC
has argued for an interpretation of Islamic law that is much more
generous to women than the interpretations proposed by the classical
jurists. Based on this progressive interpretation, the SCC has upheld
statutes that abandon classical Islamic laws in favor of laws that are
consistent with international conventions protecting the rights of
women and children.
For example, classical Islamic jurists did not speak clearly about
the right of property owners to dispose of their property. Using the
utilitarian prong of its goals analysis, however, the SCC has struck
down laws that impose heavily on landowners' right to maintain or
dispose of their property.'28 Classical jurists severely restricted
women's right to divorce. They also did not require divorced men to
pay alimony to their ex-wives, and limited women's rights to recover
funds from the father for money expended on behalf of his children.
The SCC has rejected, however, the idea that state law should follow
the classical Islamic jurists' example in these areas. Arguing first that
the Islamic scriptures do not establish a clear rule in this area and
second that the balance of harms favors a departure from the
classical rulings, the SCC has upheld as "Islamic" legislation that
requires husbands to pay alimony, 12 9 legislation that provides women
with a right to retroactive child support'3 ° and legislation that
provides Egyptian women with the right to dissolve their marriage
for "harm" if their husband takes a second wife.' 3 '

128. See id. (striking down a law requiring landlords, under certain
circumstances, to rent their property to the extended family of a deceased or
departed tenant).
129. See Case No. 7 of Judicial Year 8, 5-2 S.C.C. 265 (1993).
130. See Case No. 29 of Judicial Year 11, 6 S.C.C. 231 (1994).
131. See Case No. 35 of Judicial Year 9, 6 S.C.C. 331 (1994).
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C. AN EXAMPLE OF THE COURT'S REASONING:
A 1996 CASE ON VEILING
To understand how the Court draws upon modernist approaches to
legal reasoning in order to establish its distinctive (and to date
liberal) interpretation of shari'a, it helps to see how the Court applies
its theory in a concrete case. One of the most intriguing of the SCC's
Article 2 cases is a 1996 case involving a ministerial regulation that
forbade schoolgirls from wearing the veil in public schools.'32
In Egypt, the practice of veiling has become highly charged. In the
1980s and 1990s, veils, particularly the full-face veil known in Egypt
as the niqab, were taken by many to be a sign of sympathy with
radical Islamism.'33 Over the course of these decades, the
government became increasingly concerned about the rising number
of women and girls wearing the veil (especially the niqab) in
universities and schools.'34 Thus, in 1994, Egypt's Minister of
132. Case No. 8 of Judicial Year 17, translated in Brown & Lombardi, supra
note 7. For a different interpretation of this case, see Kilian Bilz, The Secular
Reconstruction of Islamic Law: The Egyptian Supreme Constitutional Court and
the "Battle Over the Veil" in State-Run Schools, in LEGAL PLURALISM IN THE
ARAB WORLD 229 (Baudouin Dupret et al. eds., 1999).
133. Many "veiled" women in Egypt wear a limited type of veil, known as the
hijab, which covers the hair and neck, but leaves the entire face uncovered. Some,
however, wear the niqab, which is a mre complete veil. The niqab'covers most of
the face, leaving only the eyes uncovered. Wearing the niqab is, for some, a sign of
allegiance to puritanical forms of Islam and is in some cases taken to be a sign of
allegiance to Islamism. At the time of this case, some Islamist groups espousing
such interpretations of Islam had been engaged in a violent struggle seeking to
overturn the secularist Egyptian government. Wearing the niqab (or having one's
girls wear the niqab) was thus an act that was fraught with ambiguity, but also had
tremendous potential for political significance. On types of women's dress in
Egypt, see ANDREA RUGH, REVEAL AND CONCEAL: DRESS IN CONTEMPORARY
EGYPT (Am. Univ. in Cairo Press 1987) (1986). For a discussion of the politics
associated with different types of veiling at the time this case was decided, see
GENEIVE ABDO, No GOD BUT GOD: EGYPT AND THE TRIUMPH OF ISLAM 143-61

(2000) (arguing that the veil and its symbolism provide the "most prominent
vehicle for debating women's rights").
134. See ABDO, supra note 133, at 143-61 (stating that wearing a head veil
gained support in the early 1970s due to the rejuvenation of Islamic identity and in
response to growing Western influence, and noting that Islamic groups fought hard
against university authorities who were opposed to students wearing a head veil);
see also Yasmine Abou El Kheir, Schoolgirls Unveiled Without Consent, MIDDLE
EAST TIMES, Aug. 1-7, 1994, at 1 (quoting the Minister of Education as favoring a
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Education issued an official "Decision"--essentially a formal
administrative ruling-that regulated women's dress in all schools
under the ministry's control. Controversially, the new Decision
prohibited schoolgirls from wearing veils. 3 5 In the face of massive
opposition, the government modified the order (officially, the
government said it had "clarified" the order) to state that schoolgirls
who received written permission from their parents would be
permitted to wear a hijab veil, which covered the hair, but left the
face uncovered. Girls who did not have such permission or who wore
the niqab would still be expelled from their schools. 3 6 The rule was
considered an affront by Islamists. One Islamist, the father of two
schoolgirls, challenged the ministerial Decision in an administrative
court, arguing that the ban violated the principles of the Islamic
shari'ain contravention of Article 2. He also argued that it violated
the religious freedom and the "freedom of individuality" of him and
his daughters. The case was publicized by Islamists and was widely
covered in the press. 37 The administrative court referred the case to
the SCC, which rejected the father's claims.
To resolve this case, the SCC began by giving an overview of its
general theory. Egyptian law must not violate any indubitably
authentic and unambiguous scriptural command. It must also not
work counter to the goals of the law, which include a general goal of
maximizing social benefit. Going through the first prong of its
analysis, the Court began by identifying a number of Qur'anic
commands dealing with veiling and noting the disagreements among
jurists in the past about whether they required a woman's face and
hands to be covered. 3 8 Based on its own reading of the Qur'anic
verses and on the different interpretations of these verses that
scholars had produced, the Court concluded that God had
ban on veils in school because "[wie will not let Egypt's schools become a well of
extremism and terrorism").
135. Case No. 8 of Judicial Year 17, at 1032, translated in Brown & Lombardi,
supra note 7, at 442 (noting how two girls were expelled from school for violating
the Minister of Education's decision).
136. Id. at 1031, translatedin Brown & Lombardi, supra note 7, at 442.
137. See, e.g., Nicolas Pelham, Veiled Teachers Face Ban, MIDDLE EAST TIMES,
Apr. 4-10, 1994, at 1; El Kheir, supra note 134, at 1.
138. Case No. 8 of Judicial Year 17, at 1035, translated in Brown & Lombardi,
supra note 7, at 452-54.
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unambiguously commanded women to "cover" some parts of their
bodies, but had not clearly stated which parts of a woman must be
covered. The Qur'anic command, while absolutely certain with
respect to its authenticity, was not absolutely certain with respect to
its meaning-at least insofar as it was not certain that it required
women to veil their face. Accordingly, a ministerial Decision
banning face veils was not ipso facto contrary to shari'a.1 39 The
Decision could only be deemed contrary to shari 'a if it was found to
violate the specific or general goals of the shari'a.
In the second prong of its analysis, the SCC began by focusing on
the specific goals of veiling. The Court reminded the reader that the
five ultimate goals of the shari'a are: religion, life, reason, property,
and honor/modesty. 40 Assuming that the specific goal of the
Qur'anic command to veil was the promotion of modesty, the Court
proceeded to ask whether the Minister's ban on veiling in schools
impeded the specific goal of modesty. 4 To determine this, the Court
engaged in a somewhat unsystematic analysis of whether uncovered
faces are immodest or promote immodesty. 142 It suggested that
unveiled faces do not promote lewd behavior (and might actually
prevent it), but the Court did not provide any support for this
conclusion. 143
Although the SCC had found that the Decision was not
inconsistent with the specific goal of the Qur'anic veiling command
(the promotion of "modesty"), it went on to consider whether the law
might nevertheless violate the general goals of the shari'a (the
expansion of human welfare). It concluded that a ban on women
covering their faces does not harm society. In fact, in a notable
section, the Court suggests that even if veiling did promote the
specific goal of modesty, it created a host of indirect social costs. It
implied that these other costs were so serious that, in the aggregate, a
139. Id., translatedin Brown & Lombardi, supra note 7, at 452.
140. Id. at 1032, translatedin Brown & Lombardi, supra note 7, at 448.
141. Id. at 1036-37, translated in Brown & Lombardi, supra note 7, at 455
(stating that a woman's appearance "must manifest her modesty, [must] facilitate
her legitimate contribution to what the affairs of her life require and [must] protect
her from debasement").
142. Id. at 1037-38, translatedin Brown & Lombardi, supra note 7, at 455-57.
143. Id. at 1037, translatedin Brown & Lombardi, supra note 7, at 456.
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command to veil the face would violate the fundamental axiom that
God's law cannot harm Muslims. In describing the social costs of
veiling, the Court seemed particularly concerned with the
consequences if conservatives, by forcing their daughters to veil their
144
faces, impeded their ability to work and engage in public activities.
Although the Court does not mention the point, it is perhaps
significant that the right of women to participate in society is one
recognized in international human rights documents already
145
incorporated into Egyptian constitutional law.
As the veiling case makes clear, Article 2 requires the government
to ensure that its law is consistent with shari'a precepts as they are
identified and interpreted by the Supreme Constitutional Court and
not by the Islamic scholars of the past or by the contemporary
'ulama'. As a practical matter, the Court has said that the
government must respect rules that the SCC identifies in explicit
scriptural passages of indubitable authenticity and determines to have
been widely recognized throughout Islamic history. But Article 2
also requires the government to ensure that its laws in particular
areas promote any larger social goals that the scriptures and Islamic
tradition reveal are goals for this type of law-but only to the extent
that it promotes all aspects of human welfare, including the
enjoyment of human rights.
As a result, Article 2 does not require the Egyptian government to
respect rules recognized by classical Islamic scholars if those
classical rules would, in the long run, prevent women from enjoying
their internationally recognized human rights. Indeed, Article 2
might require the Egyptian government to abandon such rules.

144. Id. at 1036, translatedin Brown & Lombardi, supra note 7, at 454 ("She
must perform tasks that will involve her mixing with others. It is therefore
unimaginable that life in all its aspects would surge around her while she would be

specifically required to be an apparition clad only in black or the like.").
145. See supra note 105 (citing Case No. 22 of Judicial Year 8 and sources
providing scholarly commentary on that case).
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IV.THE RECEPTION OF THE SCC'S
ARTICLE 2 JURISPRUDENCE
Contemporary specialists in Middle Eastern law and politics have
disagreed about how best to characterize the SCC's theory and to
explain the theory's significance. Oussama Arabi has claimed that
the Court's theory is to be understood "basically in terms of classical
Islamic legal methodology.

14 6

While the Court's method does

borrow at some general level from ideas espoused by some classical
thinkers, such a characterization seems misleading insofar as it
diverts attention from the many ways in which the SCC's theory
departs from classical theory.147 Other Islamicists examining the
SCC's theory, such as Baber Johansen148 and Frank Vogel, 14 9 have
correctly stressed that the SCC's theory departs from classical theory
and that it does not fit neatly into any of the modernist traditions of
neo-ijtihadeither. 150
146. OUSSAMA ARABI, STUDIES IN MODERN ISLAMIC LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE
174 (Arab & Islamic L. Series No. 21, 2001). Arabi also refers to the Court's
jurisprudential approach as "a version of state Shafi'ism." Id. at 195.
147. Arabi seems to minimize the Court's departures from classical assumptions
about texts and the proper way to interpret them. Most important, the classical
jurists accepted far more texts (including hadiths) as authentic and clear (and thus
legally probative) than the SCC does. Furthermore, in the areas of ijtihad, Shafi'i
sharply criticized the type of intuitive consequentialist reasoning that the SCC
seems to embrace.
148. Baber Johansen, Supra-Legislative Norms and Constitutional Courts: The
Case of France and Egypt, in THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY IN THE PROTECTION OF
HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 100, at 347, 347-76.
149. Frank E. Vogel, Conformity with Islamic Shari'a and Constitutionality
Under Article 2: Some Issues of Theory, Practice, and Comparison, in
DEMOCRACY, THE RULE OF LAW AND ISLAM

525, 525-44 (Eugene Cotran & Adel

Omar Sherif eds., 1999).
150. Johansen explicitly notes that it is hard to characterize the SCC's
methodology. Johansen, supra note 148, at 369 ("Given the wording of this article
[2], the legislator and the constitutional court... could have boldly re-interpreted
the term 'principles' in light of the Islamic modernism of Muhammad 'Abduh or
'Abd al-Razzaq al-Sanhuri. But apparently neither the legislator nor the
constitutional court had the ambition to do so."). Vogel is even stronger on this
point. Conceding that the SCC seems to be trying in good faith to establish a
theory of Islamic law, Vogel suggests:
[T]heir references to ijtihad may be no more than a careless use of words or
conceptions, especially since they are usually bolstered by purely utilitarian
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As thinkers have struggled to characterize the SCC's approach to
Islamic legal interpretation, an interesting debate has emerged,
focusing on whether the SCC's theory can plausibly be called
"Islamic." Although they are unable neatly to place the SCC's theory
in any established line of theories, most historians of Islamic law,
including Johansen and Vogel, have assumed that the Court's Article
2 jurisprudence represents a plausible, good faith attempt to
understand how Islamic law should be interpreted in the modem
era-particularly by courts applying constitutional Islamization
provisions. 51
On the other hand, some scholars-many of them social
scientists-have implicitly challenged this conclusion. They have
implied that the SCC declares constitutional principles as Islamic
without plausible Islamic justification; and that the Court has
papered over this cynical exercise through the (mis)use of technical
terms. For example, Kilian Bdlz asserts that Article 2 jurisprudence
"is nothing but a strategy used by the secular order of secular law to
maintain its autonomy."'' 2 More recently, Ran Hirshl has described
Article 2 jurisprudence as an example of a "secularizing" judicial
response to political Islamism. 53 As this article should make clear,
we incline to Johansen and Vogel's view that the SCC's theory

arguments for assigning power to decide to the state .... [T]he Court may
have begun to develop its own theory of Islamic constitutionalism and
legislation. A key element so far is devotion to fixed but highly general
principles either established by a clear text or by their pervasive influence on
fiqh . . .coupled with an openness to a freewheeling ijtihad even when that
ijtihaddiverges entirely from the views, even the consensus, of past scholars.
Vogel, supra note 149, at 538, 543-44.
151. Johansen and Vogel never question that the SCC's theory of Islamic law
should be considered an "Islamic" legal theory or that its Article 2 jurisprudence
represents a good faith attempt to measure Egyptian legislation against Islamic
norms. See, e.g., Vogel, supra note 149, at 535-38; Johansen, supra note 148, at
370.
152. Bdilz, supra note 132, at 243. A less doctrinaire but nevertheless skeptical
position is implied in some of Baudouin Dupret's analyses of Article 2. See, e.g.,
Baudouin Dupret, La Chari'a est la source de la l6gislation ': Interpretations
jurisprudentielleset thkoriesjuridiques,in ANNUAIRE DE L'AFRIQUE DU NORD 34,
261-68 (1995).
153. See Ran Hirschl, Constitutional Courts vs. Religious Fundamentalism:
Three Middle Eastern Tales, 82 TEX. L. REv. 1819, 1822-28 (2004).
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should be considered a bona fide contribution to contemporary
Islamic thought.
When considering whether the approach is a legitimate expression
of "Islamic" legal thought, two points should be noted. First, by
fusing elements of classical and modernist legal theory, the Court has
not abandoned the tradition to create something un-Islamic. It has
simply used the tradition in a creative way to create a new approach
to Islamic legal thinking in the context of constitutional thought.
Second, the fact that the SCC's theory leaves judges considerable
discretion to incorporate their normative biases into law cannot, by
itself, be used to justify a claim that the SCC's theory is nonreligious.
It is hard to argue plausibly that the SCC's theory is more
subjective than important modernist Islamic theories that are almost
invariably considered "Islamic." Such theories include Rashid Rida's
theory of utilitarian neo-ijtihad and the variants of this theory that
were championed by later Islamist activists such as Hassan al-Banna
or Sayyid Qutb (at least in his early writings).154 When faced with
two interpretations of shari'a, each heavily influenced by the
interpreter's subjective assumptions about utility, it seems arbitrary
to single out the more progressive interpretation as one that
"secularizes" Islamic law. To do so suggests that liberal economics
or respect for human rights is essentially "secular" and that a truly
"Islamic" thinker (even one with a utilitarian approach to legal
reasoning) cannot consider such principles in interpreting shari'a.
To put it differently, a statement that the SCC is "secularizing"
Islamic law implies that that the Court, when it articulated its Article
2 policy, was not interested in engaging with God's command. It was
merely trying expediently to preserve its own previously established
"secular" laws against Islamist attack. This creates a false
dichotomy. Over the centuries, a number of Islamic legal thinkers
have argued that God commanded people to understand his texts in
light of the evolving understanding of great sages or in light of the
reason bestowed by God upon humans. To such thinkers it is
154. See Rahman, supra note 89. For a discussion of the debt that the Islamic
legal theories of certain Muslim Brotherhood members, such as al-Banna and
Qutb, owe to Rida's theories, see LOMBARDI, supra note 20, ch. 3, particularly pp.
104-10 and sources cited therein.
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perfectly plausible that the shari'a, properly understood, requires the
same type of behavior as laws derived by liberal jurists trained in
secular law.
It is worth stressing that many Egyptians consider the SCC's
method of interpretation to be appropriate and its interpretation of
shari'a worthy of serious consideration. Indeed, the theory has been
imposed without provoking serious public outrage-even among
Islamists. It is notable that at a time in which Islamist militants have
been attacking the "secularist" government of Husni Mubarak and
the institutions that support this government, the SCC has so far
escaped their wrath. Indeed, in what may be a sign of acquiescence
to the Court's authority and the legitimacy of its interpretation,
Islamists keep appearing before the judges trying to convince them to
apply their theory, but to adopt a less liberal interpretation of utility
and thus to reach more conservative results-particularly in the area
of women's rights. 55 Egyptian appeals courts seem largely to have
embraced the SCC's theory-albeit with some caveats. (They tend to
be more systematic in the use of the hadith literature, a development
which may have the long-term effect of tempering the extreme
progressivism of the SCC' s interpretation of shari'a.)156
The willingness of conseryative Islamists to accept the Court's
theory raises interesting questions. Most important, if the justices of
the SCC become more conservative in the future, will they subvert
the Court's flexible (and arguably) subjective approach to
interpretation and use it for illiberal ends? At this stage, one can only
speculate about this possibility. Certainly, such a result is
conceivable. Nevertheless, such a shift will have to occur in the
context of an Egyptian legal system, staffed by judges and justices
who have been trained to respect precedent.
Although Egyptian constitutional jurisprudence does not employ
precedential reasoning in the same way as courts in the United
States, precedents are still important.157 It is possible that the

155. For a discussion of the lower courts' reaction to the SCC's theory, see
LOMBARDI, supra note 20, at 259-64.
156. Id.
157. See John Murray & Mohamed El-Molla, Islamic Shari'a and Constitutional
Interpretationin Egypt, in DEMOCRACY, THE RULE OF LAW AND ISLAM, supra note
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executive under pressure from Islamists will enact laws reflecting a
more conservative Islamic ideology (particularly in the area of
women's rights). It is also possible that some judges will personally
approve of this move. Although one can only speculate about what
would happen under those circumstances, one should bear in mind
that the impulse to approve such laws may be checked by a respect
for precedent. In such a case, a turn to the right would occur
incrementally as judges worked around the existing liberal case law.

CONCLUSION
Having described the SCC's Article 2 jurisprudence to date, we
can turn to the question with which we began this article: Does the
rise of constitutions requiring states to respect shari'a norms threaten
human rights? The SCC's Article 2 jurisprudence to date suggests
that constitutional Islamization does not, by itself, retard the
establishment of a liberal economy or lead to a serious diminution of
women's rights or other human rights.
Today there is a widespread desire in the Muslim world for a
return to "Islamic" legal values, but at the same time, there is no
consensus on how Islamic values are to be interpreted. Until
consensus forms in a particular country both on questions of
interpretive authority and on the proper approaches to Islamic legal
interpretation, we cannot say with confidence what practical effects
constitutional Islamization will have on the legal system of a
country. The Supreme Constitutional Court of Egypt's Article 2
jurisprudence shows that the effects do not have to be as dire as some
pessimists suggest.
Faced with an ambiguous constitutional provision requiring
Egyptian law to conform to undefined "principles of the Islamic
149, at 507, 508-09 (stating that while the Court cites a case for precedential value
when the law itself was deemed constitutional in a prior case, the Court does not
cite as precedent prior cases discussing and deciding legal issues); John Murray,
Techniques of ConstitutionalAnalysis in Egypt and the United States, in THE ROLE
OF THE JUDICIARY IN THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 100, at 377,

377-91 (discussing a "reasoning by example" technique of constitutional analysis
where the Court finds a prior case with specific similarities and differences with
the current case, notes the distinguishing elements that prevent the Court from
using the prior case as precedent and then uses the reasoning in the prior case as
"logical tools" to resolve the current case).
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shari'a," the SCC has boldly proposed a new approach to Islamic
legal interpretation. It has drawn from competing approaches to
Islamic legal interpretation-each with powerful supporters in
Egypt-and has developed a new approach that has broad rhetorical
appeal and which permits the SCC to pursue a liberal interpretation
of shari'a. The Court's progressive decisions to date have so far
rejected the calls of conservatives to rein in the government's attempt
to expand women's rights in Egypt. Even if Islamists were to become
politically powerful in Egypt, these precedents might make it
awkward for later governments quickly to enact "Islamic" legislation
that imposes on previously established economic rights or women's
rights.
The SCC's Article 2 jurisprudence does not represent the only
possible approach to constitutional Islamization. Courts in other
countries may use different interpretive techniques to understand the
shari'a'scommand. Alternatively, courts might use the same type of
flexible and arguably subjective forms of reasoning and come up
' Indeed, in
with a far less progressive interpretation of the shari'a."58
Egypt itself, future justices, though they are presumably constrained
by past precedents, may try to co-opt the SCC's theory and
incrementally establish a less liberal interpretation of shari'a.
Nevertheless, the history of Article 2 jurisprudence to date makes
clear that under the right circumstances a court can develop a
coherent and, apparently, politically viable liberal approach to
constitutional Islamization. It will be interesting to see whether the
SCC's liberal interpretation of Islamic law to date continues to set
the tone for Egyptian Islamic constitutional jurisprudence in the
future, and, more broadly, whether it comes to influence the thinking
of courts in other countries that have constitutionalized the shari 'a.

158. Iran, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Afghanistan and Pakistan may each provide
interesting points of comparison and contrast.
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